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Abstract 
This study unpacks the key frames and sources used by the South African print media in 
their coverage of the ‘service delivery protests’ in 2013. It explores how the frames are linked 
to each other, how the sources link to each other, and how the frames and sources 
correlate. The study focuses on print media sources as catalogued in the SA Media 
database, identifies the most prevalent frames and sources used, and using a hierarchical 
cluster analysis identifies how frames are related to each other, how sources are related to 
each other, and how frames and sources correlate. The study found that the most prevalent 
frames on ‘service delivery protests’ used by the South African print media in 2013 were the 
war/spectacle frame and the failed democracy frame, followed by the law/crime frame, all of 
which serve to delegitimise service delivery protests. Local government and police sources 
were most prevalent. The study suggests that there is still contestation about the kinds of 
spaces citizens should use for political engagement, and contestation about how power 
operates at local government level. The media also implies that the South African state is 
failing, and suggests remedies for these failings. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Choice of research 
This thesis focuses on South African print media framing of ‘service delivery protests’ with 
the aim of establishing if and how these frames are politically significant. This study is based 
on the hypothesis that media framing of ‘service delivery protests’ is not advantageous to 
protesters and highlights the dramatic elements of protest without exploring protesters’ 
underlying concerns. The second hypothesis is that the media gives salience to elite voices 
and, despite protesters wishing to draw attention to their concerns, their voices are 
subordinate in the media coverage. 
The topic for the research was chosen because with 155 major ‘service delivery 
protests’ recorded by the media or online sources in South Africa in 2013 (Municipal IQ, 
2014a), the phenomenon has become an everyday reality in the South African political 
landscape. The media are usually the main means by which such protests are brought to 
public attention (Mander, 1999; Cottle, 2008), so general knowledge and understanding 
about such protests is therefore often dependent on what the media conveys to the public. 
Many of the studies of ‘service delivery protests’ have relied on media reports as a basis for 
exploration (e.g. Nyar & Wray, 2012; Municipal IQ, 2014b, 2014a; Mottiar & Bond, 2011; 
Tapela, 2013), so even academic knowledge about the protests is often linked to how the 
phenomenon is framed by the media. In spite of the link between media coverage and 
academic knowledge of ‘service delivery protests’, few previous South Africa studies have 
explored how the media covers South African protests in general, and I could find none on 
‘service delivery protests’ in particular. 
Since protest is one action in a ‘repertoire of political participation’ (Booysen, 2007, p. 
24), it is a way for communities to call attention to their condition (Jain, 2010), identify issues 
that affect them, and publicly define themselves (Smilde, 2004). ‘Service delivery protests’ 
occur in communities which are already vulnerable and marginalised (Alexander, 2010; 
Akinboade et al., 2013), and where efforts to give voice to their political and practical 
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concerns have often been ignored (Nyar & Wray, 2012; Sinwell et al., 2009; Thompson, 
2011). Protest can be considered a type of political communication whereby protesters 
actively engage in an effort to communicate with others in their communities, local, provincial 
and national government actors, and the broader public. It is therefore important to consider 
whether media are helping communities draw attention to their issues or if they are 
aggravating marginalisation. 
Analysing media frames is a useful way to unpack how the media draws attention to 
‘service delivery protests’ and whether the media are sympathetic or not to the political 
communication of protesters. For the purpose of this study, a frame ‘identifies a problem that 
is social or political in nature, the parties responsible for causing the problem, and a solution’ 
(Johnston & Noakes, 2005, p. 5). The study aims not to simply catalogue the ‘loose 
elements’ in the newspaper articles sampled, but to explore ‘the impact of the implicitly 
present cultural phenomena conveyed by all the elements as a whole and relate them to the 
dynamic process in which social reality is constructed’ (van Gorp, 2007, p. 72–73). Implicit in 
the choice of frames is a notion of power — which are the voices that must be listened to, 
who has the power to be heard and define issues, and how do the chosen frames aid in 
maintaining or challenging the existing social order?  
This research is underpinned by a theoretical exploration of framing theory in general, 
framing theory as it relates to the practice of covering social protests, and as it relates to 
previous South African studies of media framing. The study will explore how the framing of 
‘service delivery protests’ is ‘central to the production of hegemonic meanings and to the 
development of counter-hegemonic ways of seeing’ (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 227–228). 
Central to how this study explores the framing of ‘service delivery protests’ is the 
understanding that the media are not a neutral objective observer, but a political actor in its 
own right, ‘helping to distribute political power to particular groups, causes, or individuals’ 
(Entman, 2007, p. 166). Using a framing analysis, this study will explore to which political 
actors around ‘service delivery protests’ the South African print media distributes power. 
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1.2. Rationale 
In respect of ‘service delivery protests’, the South African media has been accused of being  
‘sparse’ and offering only ‘descriptions of rioting mobs’, with ‘little or no attempt made to find 
out what motivates the protests’ (Friedman, 2011, p. 111). According to other studies, this is 
not unusual as ‘[m]ainstream media often discredit and marginalize protest action … 
[focusing] on tactics, spectacles and dramatic actions, rather than the underlying reasons for 
protest’ (Harlow & Johnson, 2011, p. 1359), with ‘selective coverage of violence’ (Baylor, 
1996, p. 249). Despite such claims, I could find no previous studies  examining how the 
South African media frames ‘service delivery protests’, although various studies have argued 
that the term is neither descriptive nor appropriate, since ‘protests frequently mix claims 
about services with other issues’ (Alexander & Pfaffe, 2014, p. 207), ‘[d]eeper discontent 
with the available channels for participatory democracy underlies the protesters’ anger’ 
(Sinwell et al., 2009, p. 9), and the term ‘is functioning as a catch-all term for multiple issues 
of governance and government’ (Nyar & Wray, 2012, p. 26).  
Research on media framing of protests elsewhere in the world has shown that ‘the 
frames used most often by the news media did not necessarily advance the protesters 
cause, and often directly hindered it’ (Baylor, 1996, p. 249). Studies in the US and Britain 
have found that while groups of protesters frame issues in one way, in the media ‘framing 
contests routinely favour political elites’ (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 216).  
I would argue that in South Africa there are competing elites1 — on the one hand, 
‘white’ South Africans who control most of the economy (Giampiccoli & Mtapuri, 2014; Ntim 
& Soobaroyen, 2013) and who may also over-determine media content in favour of white 
middle-class narratives (Friedman, 2011), and on the other hand, political elites in 
government dominated by high-ranking members of the African National Congress (ANC), 
who complain of media bias (South African Human Rights Commission, 2000). Therefore, if 
media are a ‘means by which powerful social classes maintain their control over society’ 
1 Steenveld (2004, p. 102) also argues that unlike Western societies which are largely treated as 
homogenous by the media, in South Africa ‘there is a sharp division between economic power (largely “white”), 
and political power (largely black)’. 
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(Steenveld, 2004, p. 92), the contestation between economic power brokers and political 
power brokers may well result in a different media picture of protest to that identified in the 
literature on media framing of protest in the US and Europe.  
While elsewhere in the world protest stories may ‘rely heavily on official government or 
police sources, rarely quoting protesters themselves’ (Harlow & Johnson, 2011, p. 1362),the 
representations of protests by the South African media may well be more complex, 
especially given the ‘conflicted relationship between the ANC and the political print media’ 
(Johnston, 2005, p. 13). Since the media are a ‘site of struggle where there is no consensual 
agreement between the media and the democratic government’ (Radebe, 2007, p. 99), it is 
possible that in covering ‘service delivery protests’ the media might not concede to frame the 
voice of the ‘democratic government’ as authoritative. 
As South Africa is in the process of a social change (recovering from the social 
engineering of apartheid), the media framing of ‘service delivery protests’ may ‘contribute 
new metaphors, narratives, myths, information, knowledge, and even new forms of looking 
at the world’ (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p. 147). Since ‘service delivery protests’ occur in the 
context of ‘the ongoing failure of formal channels of participation’ (Thompson, 2011, p. 2), 
the media could be problematising and challenging official government framing of reality, 
and helping communities to rectify communications break-downs. If the protests are not just 
contestations about ‘houses, water, taps and toilets, but also about political processes’ 
(Atkinson, 2007, p. 63), to what extent are problematic political processes highlighted by the 
media, and if the media does cover those processes, how are they framed? 
Given the accusations levelled at the South African mass media that ‘the journalistic 
reporting of most protest events has often obscured the finer details of perceived grievance 
issues and how these transform into protest action’ (Tapela, 2013, p. 2), as well as the 
contrasts in the South African political landscape compared with other countries, this study 
will seek to unpack how the South African media frames ‘service delivery protests’, 
comparing and contrasting this media framing with previous literature which has studied the 
framing of protests elsewhere in the world. Exploring the interaction between ‘service 
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delivery protesters’ and the media ‘represents an opportunity to examine not only frames 
embedded in news texts, but also the process of framing within movements and news 
organizations’ (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 228). 
 
1.3. Objectives 
This study aims to establish how the South African print media framed ‘service delivery 
protests’ in 2013. The study also aims to link framing in news texts ‘to broader social and 
ideological contexts’ (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 228). 
The study will also aim to establish the following: 
1. Are the frames found in other studies of media framing of social protest 
relevant to South African print media coverage (in the SA media database) of 
‘service delivery protests’ or does South African coverage generate other novel 
frames? 
2. How are the frames in SA Media sample coverage politically significant? What 
do they tell us about the organisation of power in media coverage of ‘service 
delivery protests’?  
3. What are the implications of the political, power arrangements for ‘service 
delivery protesters’ and for our understanding of ‘service delivery protests’?  
 
1.4. Methodology 
This study explores the literature on ‘service delivery protests’ and undertakes a framing 
analysis of print media coverage of ‘service delivery protests’. Although there are multiple 
media platforms in South Africa, including radio, television, print media and internet 
platforms, for ease of access to a relevant sample, this study focuses on print media sources 
as catalogued in the SA Media database. While Municipal IQ (2014a) indicates that 155 
major ‘service delivery protests’ were recorded by the media or online sources in South 
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Africa in 2013, this study focuses on the 55 print media articles in the SA Media database 
from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013. 
The sample was coded with respect to 19 frames, which were identified in other 
studies on the framing of social protest, or from the literature on ‘service delivery protests’, 
and new frames were added as they were found during the coding process. Each article was 
coded as having a frame present (1) or absent (0). The list of frames identified were as 
follows: i) contest; ii) injustice; iii) collective action; iv) inconvenience; v) economic; vi) war/ 
spectacle; vii) sympathy; viii) accountability; ix) law/crime; x) moral; xi) democracy; xii) failed 
democracy; xiii) corruption; xiv) rights; xv) high prevalence; xvi) failed governance; xvii) 
factional interests; xviii) police action; xix) dialogue. Data analysis involved identifying the 
most prevalent frames, and a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method, to identify 
which frames were linked. The sources used in each article were also identified, coded, and 
data was analysed in terms of prevalence and hierarchical cluster analysis. The cluster 
analysis of frames and sources, were then correlated to identify which sources were used 
with which frames.  
1.5. Findings 
This study found that the most prevalent frames on ‘service delivery protests’ used by the 
South African print media in 2013 were the war/spectacle frame and the failed democracy 
frame, followed by the law/crime frame. While the war/spectacle frame corresponded with 
other framing studies of protest, which found that Western media focussed on superficial 
action (Baylor, 1996; Cottle, 2008; Harlow & Johnson, 2011), the failed democracy frame 
(alongside other failing state frames) were unique to this study of protests; however, they 
were not unique to discourses on Africa (Cornwall, 2007; Englebert & Tull, 2008; Gruffydd 
Jones, 2013; Gruffydd-Jones, 2008; Szeftel, 1998). Local government and police sources 
were most prevalent in the sample, which corresponded with previous media framing studies 
of protest, which found that elite sources dominate protest coverage (Carragee & Roefs, 
2004; Gitlin, 2003; Matthes, 2012). Analysis showed that the media framing, on the whole, 
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supported neither protesters nor the state, but instead suggested that protest is illegitimate, 
but also indicative of a failing state that needs to be remedied. 
1.6. Conclusion 
This study unpacks the key frames and sources used by the South African print media in 
2013 to frame ‘service delivery protests’; and explores how the frames are linked to each 
other, how the sources link to each other, and how the frames and sources correlate. It then 
goes on to analyse the political significance of the absent and present frames, and the 
clustering of frames and sources, and what this tells us about i) the print media as a political 
role-player; ii) the ability of protesters to make their political voices heard; iii) the political 
terrain as it is shaped by and in response to ‘service delivery protests’. The study takes the 
view that the protests ‘are demonstrably the stuff of contemporary politics’ (Cottle, 2008, p. 
855), and that understanding this political terrain helps us understand more about South 
African political lives.  
Exploring the media’s construction of ‘service delivery protests’ through frames 
‘necessarily involves an examination of power’ (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 217). Exposing 
the frames inherent in South African print media of ‘service delivery protests’ in 2013, not 
only reveals the news frames, but also the frames deployed by protesters and by other 
political forces, including police, local officials, political parties, academic analysts, etc. The 
framing analysis yields important information about the kinds of social change taking place in 
South Africa, the contestation between the protesters and the state, and between the media, 
the protesters and the state.  While the study does not suggest that  ‘the divide between 
elected representatives and community members is deepening’ (Fakir & Moloi, 2011, p. 
116), it does suggest that there is still contestation about the kinds of spaces citizens should 
use for political engagement, and contestation about how power operates at local 
government level.  
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2. Literature review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates how ‘service delivery protests’ are understood in South Africa and 
puts these protests in historical context. Although I could find no previous studies of how the 
media frames ‘service delivery protests’ in South Africa, literature on the nature of these 
protests, including unpacking the causes, strategies, and processes of protest is diverse. 
With regard to this study, which looks at the media framing of ‘service delivery 
protests’, it is also important to highlight the role of the media in these struggles, since some 
‘protests were carefully planned so as to have maximum impact by involving media 
organizations … protests do not start before journalists arrive’ (Tapela, 2012, p. 75), and 
protesters in one area often mimic media examples of other protests (Booysen, 2007). 
In this section, I will contextualise ‘service delivery protests’ in relation to the history of 
protests in South Africa, the significance of violence in protest, how protests against the local 
state are related to the structure and competencies of the local state, how protests arise 
from contested notions of citizenship, and the economic climate in which protests have been 
and are taking place.  
 
2.2. Overview 
Service delivery protests in South Africa emerged after the third democratic election of April 
2004, when Thabo Mbeki took office as president for a second time (Veriava, 2014; Hart, 
2006; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Hart, 2008; Alexander, 2010; Booysen, 2007), but continue into 
the Zuma era in a similar vein (Alexander, 2010). The first ‘service delivery protest’ is usually 
identified as having taken place in Harrismith on 31 August 2004 and resulted in the death of 
a teenager, Tebogo Mkhonza (Veriava, 2014; Freedom of Expression Institute, 2004; 
Booysen, 2007). However, the term ‘service delivery protest’ did not come into popular use 
immediately, and the first record of its use appears to be in the Diamonds Field Advertiser on 
27 May 2005 (Modiba, 2005). While the term continues to be popularly used in the media, as 
well as in academic writing (e.g. Jain, 2010; Jili, 2012; Allan & He   ese, 2011; Tapela, 2012; 
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Connolly, 2014; Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Netswera & Kgalane, 
2014; Ngwane, 2011; Tsheola et al., 2014), ‘service delivery protests’ are also argued to be, 
not about service delivery, but instead about protesters ‘dissatisfaction with government’s 
poor consultation’ (Mathekga & Buccus, 2006, p. 13), ‘claims for substantive citizenship’ 
(Lau et al., 2010, p. 15), ‘problems located within local government structures’ (Sinwell et al., 
2009, p. 2), and because of ‘the ongoing failure of formal channels of participation and 
representation’ (Thompson, 2011, p. 2). 
Despite the contentions about how to understand these protests and what to name 
them, it is generally agreed that they differ somewhat from the period immediately preceding, 
where South Africa saw the rise of various well-organised ‘social movements’ tackling a 
variety of issues on an ongoing basis (Ballard, Habib, Valodia, et al., 2006). The ‘service 
delivery protests’ emerging after 2004 were different to the ‘social movement’ era, as they 
are mainly local (Ballard, Habib & Valodia, 2006; Alexander, 2010), likely to pop up suddenly 
and die down again quickly (Bond & Mottiar, 2013), with protesters often seeing themselves 
as still aligned with the ANC despite anger and frustration (Booysen, 2007; Matlala & Bénit-
Gbaffou, 2012; Marais, 2011; Sinwell et al., 2009). Even though the specifics of what each 
local area is protesting about may vary, ‘service delivery protests’ are similar ‘in forms of 
contention … geographical space … organisation … and demographics’ (Alexander & 
Pfaffe, 2014, p. 207).  
2.3. A culture of protest 
Local-level social contestation involving regular mass action by communities has been taking 
place in South Africa since at least the 1970s (Ballard, Habib, Valodia, et al., 2006; Bundy, 
2000). Recent ‘service delivery protests’ may be seen as a continuation of the contestation 
repertoires of the apartheid era, since there are ‘similarities in the issues taken up, their 
framing, repertoires of resistance, songs, symbols, etc.’ (Ngwane, 2011, p. 84). Indeed the 
‘long history of violent protest culture’ (Netswera & Kgalane, 2014, p. 264) maintains a 
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trajectory in terms of how protesters use ‘the spaces available to them as social and political 
‘theatres’’ (Bozzoli, 2004, p. 10). As under apartheid, protests today are not ‘the practice of 
the politically marginalised but of the politically engaged’ (Piper & Africa, 2012, p. 225). The 
political cultures of the past are ‘mobilised and reinvented in order to suit contemporary 
political needs and opportunities’ (Bénit-Gbaffou & Piper, 2012, p. 175).  
In the context of social and economic exclusion, by which poor black people are 
confined to the townships by their poverty, today’s protesters often live in very similar spatial 
terrains to those of apartheid, whereby ‘individual/collective bodies suffer from everyday 
violence’ (Stewart, 2014, p. 2), with limited access to housing, water, sanitation, food and 
healthcare. Because today’s protesters are similarly confined to spaces geographically 
removed from where other citizens access services, the features of mobilisation bear similar 
spatial marks, in terms of  the operations of local politics, and ‘the use of spatial technologies 
and tactics such as barricades, the myriad ways in which crowds occupy, use and 
manipulate spaces, and the struggles over territory’ (Bozzoli, 2004, p. 9). This results in 
similar identity formation and consciousness, so that space becomes ‘extraordinarily central 
to the nature of rebellions’ (Bozzoli, 2004, p. 10). Hence, struggles in post-apartheid South 
Africa ‘are very often local and immediate; they are pragmatic and quite logical responses to 
everyday hardships’ (Ballard, Habib & Valodia, 2006, p. 402). The recurrent gesturing to the 
past makes visible a particular way of understanding politics, particular ways of talking about 
being political, and a particular way of understanding what it means to be political (Veriava, 
2014). 
Like the civic organisations that came before them, ‘service delivery protests’ are 
‘focused upon aspects of life particular to their time and place’ (Bundy, 2000, p. 27). Both 
during and post-apartheid material demands are often central to mobilising protest, with 
socio-economic rights seen as central component of democracy (Zuern, 2011). We can also 
see in the operation of ‘service delivery protests’ strong connection with the civics’ notion of 
participatory democracy, whereby ‘the ballot box constituted a truncated and deformed form 
of citizen power’ (Adler & Steinberg, 2000, p. 8) — elections are not the sum total of people’s 
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political life; indeed township citizens demand much more regular, active participation in the 
political practices that determine their lives.  
While the civic organisations and structures of the past all but collapsed after the end 
of apartheid, we can arguably see in the convening of ‘service delivery protests’ a still 
surviving notion that ‘[c]ivic organizations should remain independent from and not 
participate in state structures’ (Seekings, 2000b, p. 54). The civics articulated the idea that 
‘traditional institutions of representation are inadequate and that grassroots organs of 
resistance are the embryos of popular government’ (Steinberg, 2000, p. 175). Arguably, 
service delivery protests reveal that township communities are again finding purely 
representative democracy to be inadequate. And despite the civics having ‘lost influence’ 
with the institution of new local government structures (Seekings, 2000a), similar forms of 
civic organisation are once again flexing their muscles.  
Because ‘government only listens when we toyi-toyi’ (Piper & Nadvi, 2010, p. 226), 
toyi-toyi as a ‘resistance culture’ is vital to mobilising and uniting black people in political 
action (Twala & Koetaan, 2006). While the ANC government might be strongly opposed to 
the idea that civics should play a major role in democratic representation post-apartheid 
(Seekings, 2000a), the consistent displays through (often) violent protest suggest that 
township communities still retain the right and power to contest the foreclosure of community 
organising as a means for political expression and finding voice. 
However, the current form of protest regards creating instability on the doorstep of the 
local state ‘as the most useful strategy by aggrieved members of society’ (Netswera & 
Kgalane, 2014, p. 269), so it continually re-inscribes ‘political desire within the domain of the 
nation state’ (Veriava, 2014, p. 179). This means that power is, in effect, handed to the state: 
the state must resolve issues on behalf of the people. And, in the current milieu, unlike in the 
apartheid past, there is no overarching broader national struggle uniting these grassroots, 
issue-based mobilisations (Piper & Nadvi, 2010, p. 215). Therefore, despite the regularity 
and militancy of the ‘service delivery protests’, they continue to operate in atomized silos, 
preventing ‘a broader advance’ (Mottiar & Bond, 2012, p. 328). 
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2.4. The politics of violence 
Apart from the political limitations discussed in the previous section, there are other 
problematic ways that protesters draw on the past. For example, in Mpumalanga young men 
‘draw on the repertoires of militarised masculinities of the past’ (Langa & Kiguwa, 2013, p. 
23), through which violence is ‘a nurtured male activity’ and militarism allows individuals to 
define themselves in terms of a collective, reducing feelings of social exclusion (Lau et al., 
2010). While insurgent politics can help disempowered communities recover agency, gain 
confidence, hone leadership skills, master local developmental issues, and develop a 
political identity (Ngwane, 2011), insurgent politics demonstrates ‘the paradoxical 
combination of liberatory and oppressive symbolic and physical practices’ (Von Holdt & 
Kirsten, 2011, p. 32). 
While the media are unlikely to support violent tactics (Baylor, 1996), the meanings of 
violence may be dramatically different for media and communities. Whether or not the media 
sees violent protest as legitimate, protesters undertaking violent actions usually ‘have some 
kind of broad mandate to undertake these actions on behalf of the larger and more 
heterogeneous crowd that represents the community at public gatherings’ (Von Holdt & 
Kirsten, 2011, p. 12).  
Several studies insist that ‘violent protests are instigated by the police’s use of force’ 
(Mchunu & Theron, 2013, p. 121), violence ‘comes as a direct result of police provocation’ 
(Kunene, 2014, p. 257), and ‘[h]eavy-handed policing has led to, or worsened, violent 
confrontations’ (Alexander & Pfaffe, 2014, p. 207). It may be that due to the delegitimisation 
of communities’ own created spaces of political participation, ‘reactions of authorities to the 
protests focus on the restoration of order and safeguarding of public property’ (Nyar & Wray, 
2012, p. 31), with police ‘engag[ing] in collective violence against protesting communities’ 
(Von Holdt & Kirsten, 2011, p. 3).  
However, violent protest particularly often takes place in urban and peri-urban formal 
housing areas and informal settlements with unmet service delivery needs (Tapela, 2013, p. 
3). In these areas, the ‘dynamics around poverty, unemployment, population growth, 
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inequality, relative deprivation, marginalization, injustice, indignity, identity and histories of 
struggle activism by predominantly black residents coalesce’ (ibid). Some authors argue that 
protesters were simply ‘protesting violently to reflect their frustration and anger’ (Jili, 2012, p. 
vii), the powerless ‘are fed up with being dominated and exploited’ (Paller, 2013, p. 587), and 
violent outcomes result from ‘situations where the individual feels thwarted’ (Lau et al., 2010, 
p. 12) or that ‘persisting racial inequalities result in a high level of social violence’ (Peet,
2002, p. 75). Others suggest that ‘everyday forms of community expression are mostly 
ignored by the media’ (Thompson & Nleya, 2010, p. 225), and ‘the current political climate is 
characterised by generic violent forms of engagement’ (Langa & Kiguwa, 2013, p. 27). 
While collective violence may give the poor the power to challenge authority, impact on 
the world, and force a response from authority (van Holdt in von Holdt & Alexander, 2012), 
violent actions ‘also represent strivings for societal inclusion and claims for substantive 
citizenship’ (Lau et al., 2010, p. 15). Nevertheless, violence can corrode organisations and 
paradoxically combines oppressive and liberatory practice (Von Holdt & Kirsten, 2011). 
In particular, violence is ‘a nurtured male activity … [and] therefore appears to be a 
“natural” response against the perceived threat to individual’s personal or group identity’ 
(Lau et al., 2010, p. 13). While women do take part in violent collective action, violent protest 
re-inscribes ‘social meanings of masculinity’ (Langa & Kiguwa, 2013, p. 29). So while 
violence may disrupt ‘the dominant symbolic order’ (Von Holdt & Kirsten, 2011, p. 27), it also 
expresses ‘the local hierarchies and prejudices of local moral orders’  (Von Holdt & Kirsten, 
2011, p. 32). 
2.5. Why local? How local shapes protest agendas 
A convergence of factors are leading to the local character of protests including, as already 
discussed, that protesters have seemingly not identified a national uniting theme, despite the 
impact that national government decisions are having on local governments (Kunene, 2014; 
Nyar & Wray, 2012). Aside from that, many of South Africa’s municipalities are understaffed, 
with no proper policy framework, no performance management systems, under-qualified 
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staff and officials appointed on the basis of political reliability, not skills (Koelble & Siddle, 
2013a). Despite the inclusion in law of democratically elected ward councils, integrated 
development planning (IDP), and the necessity of consulting widely on local government 
budgeting processes, these systems for local participation in government are not functioning 
properly in many cases (e.g. Booysen, 2007; Atkinson et al., 2006; Netswera & Kgalane, 
2014; Tapela, 2012; Akinboade et al., 2013; Koelble & Siddle, 2013a). So it would not be 
surprising if protests occurred because of ‘local authorities’ failure/ inability to deliver basic 
services’ (Akinboade et al., 2013, p. 459) and  ‘protests were about lack of or poor services 
delivery … which in turn is a result of poor management’, corruption, nepotism, low budget 
and of pro-market policies adopted by the new governments (Jili, 2012, p. vii).  
Arguably, some of the failures of the new local government structures can be traced 
back to the ANC’s dismantling of the civics, and the way it confined civic organisation to a 
developmental, not political role (Seekings, 2000a). In the height of apartheid civic 
organisation, it was clear that democracy was about more than just formal institutions and 
processes; it ‘must include a political culture which allows for dissent’ (Cherry, 2000, p. 106). 
While the new local government structures sought to suppress the ‘insurrectionary 
inheritance’ of the civic movement past (Adler & Steinberg, 2000), ‘service delivery protests’ 
suggest that such suppression has not been entirely successful. 
As the new systems of local government go along with ‘policies of fierce fiscal 
austerity’ that starve local governments of resources (Hart, 2008, p. 681), municipalities 
emerge as sites of contradiction in terms of how the South African state conceives of its role 
in governing poor bodies, ‘encapsulating in an intense form the tensions between stern 
rhetorics of efficiency, fiscal discipline, and responsibility on the one hand, and invocations of 
local participation, social justice, and democracy on the other’ (Hart, 2008, p. 684). 
Nevertheless, while some government officials react to local protests with ‘honest 
acceptance’ (Atkinson, 2007, p. 53), other officials insist that ‘service delivery protests’ are 
not driven by need but by selfish political motives (Mkhabela, 2014), aggravated by criminal 
activity (Miraftab, 2006, p. 195). Government officials are not the only ones arguing that 
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protests are not about service delivery; several authors have argued that service delivery is 
not the central issue: rather ‘relative deprivation’ (Allan & Heese, 2011, p. 2) and ‘income 
inequality must rank highly among the structural determinants of the protests’ (Alexander, 
2010, p. 32), as protesting communities ‘are typically significantly poorer, have higher levels 
of unemployment and have lower access to services than the average resident living in their 
municipalities’ (Akinboade et al., 2013, p. 459). Some authors argue that protests are about 
community perceptions rather than the objective circumstances (Nleya, 2011), because 
people are willing to wait for delivery unless they see everyone else in their municipality 
getting services while they wait (Allan & Heese, 2011). 
Other authors find that ‘protests have not only been about houses, water, taps and 
toilets, but also about political processes’(Atkinson, 2007, p. 63). Arguably, elected 
representatives are letting constituents down by improving their own lot while ignoring the 
plight of the communities they serve (Alexander, 2010). Frequently, there are no effective 
channels to air grievances or resolve problems at local level (Nleya, 2011), and protest often 
follows from ‘unsuccessful requests to meet ward councillors or municipal officials in order to 
share grievances’ (Nyar & Wray, 2012, p. 30).  
Across much of the literature on ‘service delivery protests’, authors identify ‘local 
clientelism as a rising form of relationship between voters and the state’ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 
2012), with community members often claiming that government officials were ‘engaging in 
nepotism’ (Jain, 2010, p. 31). For example, in Sedibeng reasons for protest included 
allegations of ‘rampant corruption and nepotism in local government structures’ (Akinboade 
et al., 2013, p. 467), while in Phomolong ‘various structures of the local state aid the politics 
of patronage and clientelism’ (Kunene, 2014, p. 79). Despite laying claims of corruption, 
none of the research actually investigates the claims to establish validity. Some research 
has found that perceptions of corruption are ‘exacerbated by the clumsiness, opacity, 
confusion and capriciousness’ of state functions (Rubin, 2011, p. 488).  International 
research has found that ‘perceptions of corruption are in fact only weakly linked to actual 
experience’ (Harrison, 2006, p. 15). Indeed, it is difficult to find evidence to determine ‘if 
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corruption levels are worsening or whether there has simply been increasing legal and public 
recognition … [or] manipulation of public fears’ (Brown & Cloke, 2004, p. 278). 
Instead, corruption discourses frame ‘particular norms and values of bureaucratic 
practice’ as the only acceptable model (Harrison, 2006, p. 15), and imagines a state that is 
able ‘to separate good management techniques … from the political content of what is being 
managed’ (Polzer, 2001, p. 20). Such notions of the state and bureaucracy express an 
ideology that the government should perform purely technical functions, without being 
influenced by ‘the various networks, factions and institutions that collectively get called “the 
state”’ (Pierce, 2006, p. 898). Corruption discourses contribute to perceptions of Africa as 
‘less able to construct good societies’ (Gebel, 2013, p. 327), and function as ‘political 
strategies to restructure the laws, institutions and the civil society in target countries’ (Gebel, 
2013, p. 319). Nevertheless, as elsewhere in Africa, community assertions of corruption are 
complex in that they ‘might contain both a popular antipathy to corruption and a struggle for 
patronage’ (Alexander, 2010, p. 11). Discourses of corruption reveal a ‘complex interplay 
between indigenous and foreign understandings of appropriate governmental conduct’ 
(Pierce, 2006, p. 888). 
Despite being critical of the discourse, it may still be true that ‘there are no effective 
measures to deal with corrupt or incompetent municipal councillors and officials, nor ways to 
make these officials downwardly accountable’ (Tapela & Pointer, 2013) so that people view 
themselves ‘as powerless objects and subjects of the government, rather than as citizens 
whose voice was taken seriously’ (Fakir & Moloi, 2011, p. 112). Hence, the protests have 
been read as being rooted in a crisis ‘of formal democratic structures and processes 
embedded in the formal spaces’ (Thompson, 2011, p. 2). The breakdown of communication 
between protesting communities and their elected officials occurs despite structures of ward 
councils and integrated development planning being in place to ensure public participation in 
local decision-making (Tsheola, 2012). Therefore, people try to assert political power by 
building a collective community voice, distinct from formal party politics (Alexander, 2010); in 
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turn these new spaces created by communities tend to be delegitimised by institutions of 
power, who only recognise their own facilitated structures as legitimate (Miraftab, 2006).  
The delegitimisation (and sometimes even criminalisation) of community’s own created 
structures of political participation, ‘paint a picture of repressive state rather than an 
accommodating and approachable state’ (Sinwell et al., 2009, p. 9). The climate of 
regulating service delivery through integrated development planning structures can 
exacerbate ‘dangerous divisions in South Africa’s social fabric, eroding public accountability 
and fomenting the public apathy, frustration and anger necessary for violent protestations’ 
(Tsheola, 2012, p. 165).  
However, while some may argue that protests ‘reflect disappointment with the fruits of 
democracy’ (Alexander, 2010, p. 37) and protesters ‘have lost their  trust in government’ (Jili, 
2012, p. 76), it is also true that these protests do not necessarily represent a radical break 
against the forms of governance or even ‘a radical critique of neoliberal policies pursued by 
the ANC run capitalist state’ (Kunene, 2014, p. 296). Despite the negative impact of the 
ANC’s neoliberal policies on the poor (Habib & Padayachee, 2000), protesters often fail to 
recognise that national government may be as responsible for their woes as local 
government (Nyar & Wray, 2012). For example, while protesters identify local officials as 
corrupt, the discourse ignores the role of neoliberal practices in enabling corruption: as 
neoliberalism has led to privatisation and out-sourcing, so government officials have been 
able to use their privileged position to benefit from the resulting business opportunities, at 
the same time as state spending cuts have left the state with a limited budget to monitor and 
regulate itself (Brown & Cloke, 2004; Harrington & Manji, 2013; Harrison, 2006, 1999; 
Pierce, 2006; Szeftel, 1998). Internationally, corruption discourses have  become more 
prevalent as neoliberalism has rolled out (Brown & Cloke, 2004; Harrison, 2006; Pierce, 
2006; Szeftel, 1998), with communities identifying corrupt individuals as the problem — not 
the economic and political system. So protesters ‘stress that they are loyal to the ANC and 
believe that the root of their problems is located within local government structures and not 
within the ANC itself’ (Sinwell et al., 2009, p. 2). 
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Whereas protesters may be seen as an oppositional part of civil society, given the lack 
of resistance to the overarching state per se, protest is ‘closely articulated with or integrated 
into — even contradictorily and co-optively at times — key elements of the ruling 
establishment’ (Berger, 2002, p. 26). Thus the protests can be seen as the ‘contestation 
between factions for power … [which] continues to take place through the ANC’ (von Holdt, 
2013, p. 599). In these contestations, contained within the party-political structure of 
governance, interactions between democratic institutions and power relations tend to lead to 
‘practices of violence in struggles over social order and hierarchy’ (Von Holdt & Kirsten, 
2011, p. 7). Nevertheless, the processes of protest remain quite ritualised — as already 
discussed, even the tactics do not represent a break from the established social order, since 
protesters continue to mimic the ‘insurgent civil society of the struggle against apartheid’ 
(ibid), using burning tyres and barricading roads (Mottiar & Bond, 2011, p. 314), 
‘memoranda, petitions, toy-toying, procession, stay-aways, election boycotts … looting, 
destruction of buildings, chasing unpopular individuals out of townships …’ (Alexander, 
2010, p. 26). 
 
2.6. Protest, the construction of citizenship and forms of state 
Despite the continuities with the past, people shape their lives in geographically and 
historically nested ways (Ballard, 2014), so these mimicking practices also inscribe ‘new 
meanings of “true liberation” … new constructs around what true citizenship might mean’ 
(Langa & Kiguwa, 2013, p. 25). Although ‘service delivery protests’ can be seen as a means 
by which protesters hold the state to account, it is also true that by enshrining constitutional 
rights which will only be realised over time (as for social economic rights), the state has 
adopted ‘global and internal measures whereby segments of the population are treated 
differently, leading to injury, violence and vulnerability’ (Stewart, 2014, p. 2). While local 
government policies and structures are designed to increase local participation in state 
decision-making, ‘translating policy into meaningful and effective participation at the local 
level for all groups is proving difficult’ (McEwan, 2005, p. 974).  
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Even though these new policies and structures of governance are accompanied by 
rights enshrined in the constitution and new technologies for governing the poor (albeit ones 
articulating policies of fiscal austerity, such as prepaid meters) (Veriava, 2014; Tissington, 
2013; Tapela, 2012; Van Heusden, 2012; von Schnitzler, 2008), many poor black 
communities are still on the political and socio-economic periphery (Kotze & Taylor, 2010). 
Some argue that the resulting ‘service delivery protests’ present ‘unambiguous illustrations 
of a faltering democracy’ (Tsheola et al., 2014, p. 392), and that ‘pockets of fragility were 
creeping into South Africa and the state’ (Connolly, 2014, p. 88). They argue that a need 
exists for ‘genuine public participation’ to curb ‘the space for rebellion’ (Nembambula, 2014, 
p. 149) and renewal of the state-society contract ‘to prevent future protests and violence’
(Connolly, 2014, p. 88). 
This ‘failing state’ discourse ‘must be recognized as a contemporary successor to a 
much longer genealogy of imperial discourse about Africa’ (Gruffydd Jones, 2013, p. 49). 
Through this discourse the African state is identified as lacking and inferior, creating a 
situation in which protest thrives, while ‘the achievement of a democratic civic tradition [is] all 
the more elusive in South Africa’ (Reddy, 2010, p. 203). The assumption underlying this 
discourse is that a high prevalence of protest is counter to a thriving democracy. 
Given that ‘service delivery protests’ remain local and do not build into a broader 
movement, it can be argued that ‘service delivery protests’ actually reveal the strength of the 
state, not its fragility, in that it is able to contain the spread of protests. The protests ‘seem to 
stem less from abject failure to provide services and entitlements than from the partial 
success of those efforts’ (Marais, 2011, p. 458). In a sense, post-2004, the ANC government 
has out-maneuvered the social movements that contested state apparatus from the late 
1990s, as these movements have all but collapsed, while the ongoing protests ‘exemplify the 
failure of the first round of post-apartheid NSMs [New Social Movements] to tap into huge 
reservoirs of popular anger and discontent’ (Hart, 2008, p. 682).   
Nevertheless, I argue that the landscape of citizenship is empty for the poor and revolt 
will emerge ‘in spite of everything that is established to prevent or suppress it’ (Veriava, 
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2014, p. 40); township communities have not forfeited the cornerstones of their 
insurrectionary past. Abstract constitutional rights are ‘unresponsive to the everyday 
violence’ of poverty (Stewart, 2014, p. 20), because those expressing distress about their 
material conditions ‘are often met with direct state resistance, political confrontation, and 
conflict with the law’ (Stewart, 2014, p. 6). Although the constitution guarantees socio-
economic rights (if they are affordable), it also uses a ‘paradoxical device’ of ‘progressive 
realisation’ of rights such that it constitutes ‘a state of exception, in which the rights of the 
citizen are [indefinitely] suspended and deferred pending appropriate governmental action’ 
(Veriava, 2014, p. 211). While protest may well be about the ‘terms of inclusion in the 
system’ (Piper & Africa, 2012, p. 225) the system is only able to respond with a ‘mix of force 
and persuasion’ (Ngwane, 2011, p. 128) since it has identified a second economy2 which 
makes a segment of society ‘superfluous to the “modern economy” and in need of paternal 
guidance’ (Hart, 2006, p. 26). 
Despite discourses of participation, the poor are seen as an underclass who make 
continual demands on the state amid a ‘culture of entitlement’, even though they are also the 
site at which the wrongs of apartheid must also find redress (Veriava, 2014). Indeed, 
‘[b]elying the constitutional universalism of rights are representations of the non-working 
poor as an alien threat to the body politic, for which self-help is a psychological as well as 
social treatment’ (Barchiesi, 2011, p. 107). By associating emancipation and liberation with 
‘self-reliance’, the ANC authors fiscal discipline and market forces as the solution to poverty 
(Barchiesi, 2011). Even though it still celebrates ‘the contribution of grassroots radicalism to 
liberation, the new rulers moved to tame and defuse it as inimical to investment and growth’ 
(Barchiesi, 2011, p. 64). 
2 According to Thabo Mbeki (2003), South Africa is constituted of two economies, not one. The first 
economy is modern, technologically savvy and educated, while the second economy is composed of unskilled 
people who are surplus to the first economy due to low employability. 
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2.7. Economy as a system of exclusion 
Even before the end of apartheid, the state tried to ‘respond to black South Africans’ 
demands through their integration as consumers of services’ (Van Heusden, 2012, p. 231). 
In line with this notion of citizens as consumers, the ANC government became ‘preoccupied 
with the fiscal consequences of non-payment’ (Barchiesi, 2011, p. 64). Starting with its 
Operation Masakhane in 1995, the ANC urged South Africans ‘to pay for services such as 
water, electricity, sewerage, and refuse collection’ (McDonald & Pape, 2002, p. 1). Thus, the 
state tried to prepare those who are unable to pay to accept limited services, and therefore a 
neoliberal model of cost-recovery dominates in national legislation and local government 
practice (McDonald & Pape, 2002). At the same time, government services saw ‘increasing 
privatization and commercialization, particularly in the form of public sector corporatization 
where publicly owned and operated … systems are managed like private businesses’ 
(McDonald & Ruiters, 2005, p. 13–14). Thus, in response to the ‘ideological dichotomy 
between private-based and state-driven solutions, the ANC invokes a flexible pragmatism of 
public-private partnerships’ (Barchiesi, 2011, p. 71).  
The introduction of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) in 
1996, saw increased cuts to social spending, privatisation, a restructuring of public services 
and fiscal restraint (Fiil-Flynn & Naidoo, 2004). Several authors argue that the problems that 
dog local government and lead to ‘service delivery protests’ now, can be traced back to 
these national government neoliberal economic policies, which have ‘sustained massive 
inequality’ (Alexander, 2010, p. 37) because the pressure to cut costs at local government 
level has contributed to ‘a sharp deficit in terms of service delivery’ (Mathekga & Buccus, 
2006, p. 15).  
It may be true that the commercialisation, handed down from national government to 
local government, makes the policy of locally based decision-making, based in local 
advocacy, a moot point (Tsheola, 2012). However, case study research has often found 
among protesters ‘an absence of a radical critique of the neoliberal policies pursued by the 
ANC-run capitalist state’ (Kunene, 2014, p. 296). Perhaps this is because ‘service delivery 
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protests’ are focussed on the local government and protesters fail to recognise that ‘local 
government only has certain powers and functions … [and] some dissatisfaction should be 
directed towards other spheres of government’ (Nyar & Wray, 2012, p. 24).  
However, ‘service delivery protests’ continue, even though national policy has changed 
in response to the resistance to privatisation during the new social movement phase of 
protest (Veriava, 2014; Hart, 2013a, 2006), and due to the failure of GEAR to create jobs 
and ensure redistribution (du Toit & Neves, 2007). Instead, the government has moved 
towards a notion of a ‘developmental state’ (Aliber et al., 2006), with increased government 
spending, slowed down privatisation of key parastatals, expanded public works programmes, 
an extended social security through broader access to social grants, and creating a role for 
‘community development workers’ to identify people who were ‘unregistered’ and ‘indigent’ 
so as to ‘draw them into social security nets’ (Hart, 2006, p. 13). 
After the first phase of fiscal austerity which sought to ‘”normalise” the fiscal 
relationship between the state and its citizens’ (von Schnitzler, 2008, p. 907), the state 
began to transfer huge resources from the national coffers to local governments, while trying 
to bring local governments under provincial and national government control (Hart, 2013a). 
The main way that these transfers take place is through government’s indigent policies; and, 
as a result, the roll-out of indigency policies are a key site through which local government 
tensions play out (Tissington, 2013; Hart, 2013a). Part of the conflict arises because while 
government has set the broad terrain for indigency and allocates funds to local governments 
based on the number of indigent citizens, each municipality is left to determine for itself who 
can and will be classified as indigent (Tissington, 2013; Hart, 2013a).  
With regard to determining who and who is not indigent, local government is the site of 
contradictory impulses that arise from two different definitions of citizenship. On the one 
hand, government is anxious to ‘create a consumer citizen who will … understand the fiscal 
responsibilities of citizenship’ (von Schnitzler, 2008, p. 916). On the other hand, the 
government is trying to identify and target poor households with free basic services through 
municipal indigent registers (Tissington, 2013). This involves local governments in ‘endless 
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battles’ to sort out which of their constituents cannot pay for services and which are simply 
unwilling to pay (Hart, 2013a). At the same time, ‘the poor come to occupy an extremely 
paradoxical place’ (Veriava, 2014, p. 210), whereby they are both dangerous classes, who 
amid a “culture of entitlement” are making undeserved claims on the state purse and they 
also deserve ‘a modicum of social security, but on tightly disciplined terms’ (Hart, 2006, p. 
26). These two state conceptions of citizenship are also at odds with people’s own 
conceptions, whereby township residents express the belief that they have a right to basic 
services and question the deferral of those rights, challenging ‘the imposition of the rule of 
money as a social relation’ (Van Heusden & Pointer, 2006, p. 110).  
The complexities of how the different notions of citizenship play out puts municipalities 
at odds with councillors and with township residents resulting in ‘indigent policies [that] are 
not effective at ensuring that basic services are affordable to all’ (Tissington, 2013, p. 74). 
Just as apartheid was ‘an exclusionary mechanism that allocated rights and privileges on the 
basis of racial group membership’ (Twala, 2014, p. 159), so too the indigent policies seek to 
exclude most citizens from access to free services and resources, with a ‘tight-fisted attitude 
to any meaningful assistance’ (Tissington, 2013, p. 73). Through indigent policies, the poor 
are pathologised as having ‘external ailments that strike individuals and groups predisposed 
to specific misfortunes or lack of initiative, morality, or temperament’ (Barchiesi, 2011, p. 72). 
So economic policies and the complex bureaucracy for determining who is indigent 
make it difficult to effectively address South Africa’s sharp and growing inequalities, and 
what are ostensibly ‘pro-poor’ policies feed into and inflame ‘the popular anger they were 
designed to contain’ (Hart, 2013a, p. 97). The efforts to systematise the definition of who is 
poor, or rather so poor that they cannot afford to pay, is ‘tearing apart the fabric of local 
government’ (Hart, 2013a, p. 141). In essence, the state is trying to provide technical 
solutions to political problems (Hart, 2013a), and arguably, through ‘service delivery 
protests’, communities are refusing to have the political content of their lives — questions 
about power relations and their access to rights — reduced to technocratic bean counting.  
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Resisting the exclusion created by the state’s economic notions of citizenship, ‘service 
delivery protests’ may be seen as an effort by citizens to make themselves, and their 
struggles for meagre livelihoods, visible. While the state definitions of citizenship only leave 
room for agency in terms of paying for and consuming services, through ‘service delivery 
protests’, township dwellers reassert a broader definition of citizenship and agency, whereby 
they can contest local power relations and local systems of delivery. 
 
2.8. Conclusion 
The literature on ‘service delivery protests’ identifies diverse but overlapping motivators of 
protests. On the one hand, local politicians try to juggle competing demands in terms of 
managing fiscal austerity; on the other they are faced with powerful demands from their 
constituencies (Hart, 2002). Viewing this from the outside, protesters experience ‘numerous 
frustrations, often building up over a long period of time’ (Atkinson, 2007, p. 58). Given the 
local understandings of rights enshrined in the constitution, protesters see themselves as 
demanding citizenship rights, not just for service delivery (socio-economic rights) but also 
the right to have a voice (Thompson, 2011; Tapela, 2012; Thompson & Nleya, 2010). How 
this complex picture plays out in the media will be discussed in succeeding chapters. 
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3. Theoretical underpinnings 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, which sought to understand the nature of ‘service delivery protests’, 
we can see a struggle between different protest interpreters who compete in framing 
contests to sponsor ‘their preferred definition of issues’ (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 216). 
This chapter will unpack what ‘framing’ is and how it functions through the media. The 
chapter will also look at how protesters are understood to deploy framing to draw attention to 
their issues: to understand framing theory about media coverage of protests, it is necessary 
to recognise that both the protesters and the media engage in framing.  
This chapter will not only unpack media framing theory, but also framing theory about 
political protest. As there is barely any research on the media framing of protest in South 
Africa, the theory for understanding the media framing of ‘service delivery protests’ is drawn 
from international literature as well as, in a small way, South Africa studies of media framing 
on topics related to protest, such as media framing of violence, media framing the struggle 
for anti-retroviral treatment, and media framing of the Marikana massacre. Similarly, I could 
find no South African studies that explore how South African protesters frame their issues, 
so the theoretical input in this regard is also drawn from the international literature. 
 
3.2. Defining framing 
Framing can be defined as ‘part of the collective struggle over meaning that takes place 
through a multiplicity of media and interpersonal communication’ (Vliegenthart & Zoonen, 
2011, p. 106). Communication is not simply a mirror for the world, but involves building an 
understanding of the world from a particular point of view. Through framing, the complex 
nature of objective reality, which is often untidy or chaotic, is reduced to an orderly, 
understandable whole (van Gorp, 2007). When people engage in framing, they cull aspects 
of reality to build a story that makes connections between the culled elements and promotes 
a particular interpretation of reality (Entman, 2007). Therefore, framing is an active (albeit 
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often unconscious) process of choosing what aspects of reality to communicate, and what to 
leave out, thereby actively defining problems , diagnosing causes, making moral judgements 
and suggesting remedies (Entman, 1993).  
A frame organises thinking by highlighting certain events and facts, then linking them 
together in a coherent way, that makes some aspects of reality seem pertinent, and 
rendering other aspects as irrelevant or invisible (Ryan & Gamson, 2006). However, frames 
do not stand apart from social life; they are ‘inevitably part of a much larger set of structures, 
or societal ideology, that finds its manifestation in the text’ (Reese et al., 2001, p. 14). 
Framing theory looks at both media frames and societal frames in which media messages 
are embedded; frames are ‘shared and persistent over time … [they] work symbolically to 
meaningfully structure the social world’ (Reese et al., 2001, p. 11).  Indeed news frames flow 
from society into the media frames, and media frames flow back into society reinforcing or 
altering existing social frames; beneath every successful frame lies ‘discarded “social 
narratives,” or cultural meanings’ (Durham, 2001, p. 129).  News discourse operates in a 
domain of ‘shared beliefs about society … [which] are known and accepted by a majority of 
society as common sense or conventional wisdom’ (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p. 57). And 
because frames are embedded in wider social structures, they can seem ‘so natural and 
normal that the process of social construction remains invisible’ (van Gorp, 2007, p. 63). 
Frames can seem routine, can be taken for granted, and ‘contribute to the structure of 
dominance’ in society (Gamson et al., 1992, p. 381). 
Therefore, frames are not politically neutral; the contest over meaning is an ideological 
contest (Pan & Kosicki, 2001), in which certain perspectives are amplified, while others are 
quelled (Shah et al., 2002). Framing is a process of ‘active, interested meaning creation by 
different actors vying for support for their respective positions’ (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005, p. 46). 
Framing interprets and constructs narratives based on the distribution of power in society, 
and is therefore linked to hegemonic meanings and ‘to the development of counter-
hegemonic ways of seeing’ (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 227–228). 
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Therefore, in choosing a frame, a narrator confers agreement and power on particular 
social actors, ‘helping to distribute political power to particular groups, causes, or individuals’ 
(Entman, 2007, p. 166). The media are centrally implicated in these framing contests, since 
the media ‘play an important role in selecting, defining, and communicating pertinent issues 
in society, especially in periods of socio-economic and political flux’ (Williams, 2006, p. 430). 
The media are commonly expected to be broadly representative, represent diverse views 
and connect different parts of society (Radebe, 2007), but instead the media choose 
between different frames to tell a story, and this partly determines the meaning society 
ascribes to events (Hertog & McLeod, 2001). Media framing takes place in a political terrain 
where power is already asymmetrically distributed, and so the powerful are already better 
placed to influence news frames (Carragee & Roefs, 2004). Media frames are then ‘shaped 
by the frames sponsored by multiple social actors’ (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 216). 
Therefore analysing and unpacking frames inherent in media stories enables one to examine 
political power relations in society; identifying which frames are prevalent in a group of news 
stories reveals which groups (typically elites) are routinely favoured and whose views are 
routinely suppressed. 
Because of the ability of frame analysis to examine the politics at play around an issue, 
frame analysis is an excellent tool for understanding media coverage of ‘service delivery 
protests’ in South Africa. Framing analysis can make explicit the different frames deployed 
by different social actors, examine the power relations between these social actors, and 
explore the different narratives about ‘service delivery protests’. Through frame analysis, we 
can explore not only the media framing of ‘service delivery protests’, but also the kinds of 
‘common sense’ or ‘conventional wisdoms’ about ‘service delivery protests’ in South African 
society. As will be discussed in the next section, the political quality of framing also shapes 
the framing of protest in the media. 
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3.3. Media framing of protest 
Frames are principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little 
tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters. 
(Gitlin, 2003, p. 6) 
In his seminal work on how the mass media framed the US political struggles of the 1960s, 
Gitlin (2003, p. 251) (first edition 1980) highlighted how ‘the production of news is a system 
of power’, by which the media are implicated and involved in constructing the meaning of 
different political actions and actors, helping to determine their fate. These meanings are not 
constructed by the direct intervention of the elite, since they do not ‘produce and disseminate 
ideology directly’ (Gitlin, 2003, p. 254). Nevertheless, the US media in reporting on protests, 
served to stabilise the ‘liberal democratic capitalist society’ (Gitlin, 2003, p. 256).  
Later studies of media coverage of protest have also found that the media are not 
neutral, but ‘part of politics and part of protest, the three of them are inextricably intertwined 
in ongoing events’ (Oliver & Maney, 2000, p. 463). Accordingly, media are not simply 
recorders of events but are political actors in their own right and like other political actors, 
‘fight to control the construction of social meaning’ (Walgrave & Manssens, 2005, p. 117). 
However, gaining control is not an entirely smooth process because the liberal media 
tolerate different views and ideologies, striving to create the impression that political views 
and opinions flow freely (Gitlin, 2003).  
International research on the media framing of protests highlights how protests are 
treated by the media as ‘a potential or actual disruption of legitimate order’ (Gitlin, 2003, p. 
271). Conflict and violence in protests may be portrayed as dysfunctional, not as ‘an 
important vehicle for establishing social relations’ (Mander, 1999, p. 4). Whereas protesters 
may have come together to act collectively, ‘media discourses work to encourage 
adversarial frames’ (Gamson, 2003, p. 102). Media coverage tends to focus on the actors 
and actions, not the ‘structural causes of events’ (Gamson, 2003, p. 93). The media’s 
chosen frames are often ‘controlling, hegemonic and tied to larger elite structures’ (Reese, 
2007, p. 149), revealing ‘the imprint of power’ (Entman, 1993, p. 55).  
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Media frames of protests in previous studies have shown ‘recurring ideological 
patterns’ (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 224), including militant frames (Baylor, 1996), public 
nuisance frames (Di Cicco, 2010), law and (dis)order frames (Cottle, 2008),  delegitimising 
and spectacle frames (Harlow & Johnson, 2011), the diagnostic frame (Scheufele, 1999, 
p. 114), the remedy promotion frame (Entman, 2007, p. 164), catastrophic, contest and 
moral frames as well as costing, legalistic procedural frames and economic analysis frames 
(Pointer, 2013). In maintaining such ideological consistency, the mainstream media may 
bolster frames so that they become ‘valuable for maintaining social order’ (Hertog & McLeod, 
2001, p. 143). 
While ‘the media may function to reinforce existing power arrangements with the social 
system’ (Strohm, 1999, p. 81), when the power arrangements and social systems are in a 
state of flux, the media may align with and reinforce either the old elite or the new guard 
entering power. In South Africa, although ‘the old economic elite managed to retain the 
majority of its power’ (Sparks, 2009, p. 213) becoming a formal democracy has led to some 
re-ordering of political opportunities and power structures (Barnett, 2003). So it is possible 
that new opportunities have opened for different actors to influence news coverage, albeit 
amid ‘ongoing compromises and negotiations between different imperatives and norms’ 
(Barnett, 2003, p. 15). But even if the orientation of the media and the rules of interaction 
between groups of political actors and the media have radically altered (Voltmer, 2004), 
South Africa’s print media — like the print media in the Western world — is largely 
commercialised (Duncan, 2003), with liberalism prevailing ‘as the dominant political ethos’  
(Wasserman & De Beer, 2004, p. 68).  
Like the liberal media in the Western world, South Africa’s media ‘have avoided 
playing a leading role in promoting broader discourse on the deeper and more complex 
issues’ (Bornman, 2013, p. 445). The interests of the poor are marginalised by the South 
African media (Duncan, 2003), and ‘there is still substantial racism, xenophobia and white 
middle-class bias in the South African press’ (van Baalen, 2013, p. 18). As will be discussed 
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in the next section, the media orientation poses dilemmas and challenges for poor 
communities and protesters trying to communicate about their issues to the wider world.  
 
3.4. Protesting and collective action frames 
In South Africa, community meetings among those who are interested in public affairs often 
precede protest  (Nleya, 2011). In such meetings, those facing difficulties discuss their 
problems and who is responsible for addressing those problems (Pointer, 2004; Baud & 
Rutten, 2004). So protest actions usually follow from systematic planning, with the protest 
activities being agreed and negotiated before the protest takes place, depending on 
available skills and resources needed to create a protest (Kunene, 2014; Thompson & 
Nleya, 2010). Protests are ‘not simply the spontaneous uprising of the people. At the centre 
of protest is usually a close-knit co-ordination centre’ (Kunene, 2014, p. 303).  
However, individual participants in such meetings rarely share identical views and 
motivations (Snow, 2008); instead the variance in discussions reveals ‘dislocations, 
instabilities and contestations in social relations, and in the meanings of these relations’ (Von 
Holdt & Kirsten, 2011, p. 7). Meetings therefore often involve efforts to resolve these areas 
of disagreement and the discussions leading up to protest involve finding a shared 
understanding — ‘a collective sense of injustice’ (Paller, 2013, p. 587). The activities 
involved in discussing and resolving contentions between community members and finding a 
shared understanding can be understood as framing contests, whereby some meanings are 
chosen and others are discarded. In order to resolve discussions into a political programme, 
groups of protesters engage in framing to connect ‘events, experiences, and strands of one 
or more ideologies so they hang together in a relatively integrated and meaningful fashion’ 
(Snow, 2008, p. 400). Through community meetings, we can see protesters as ‘signifying 
agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, 
antagonists and bystanders or observers’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613). 
These ‘collective action frames’ are an attempt by protesters to co-ordinate and inspire 
shared action and to legitimate the group’s activities and campaigns (Benford & Snow, 
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2000), as well as to challenge existing elite views (Snow, 2008). Therefore, protests can be 
understood as a form of political communication — protesters communicate to connect with 
each other, to connect with others in their community, to challenge adversaries and to 
communicate with the world at large (Baud & Rutten, 2004). 
 However, it can be argued that protest is only an effective form of political 
communication if it reaches a wide audience: 
... it is not enough for an organisation … to be legitimate within the communities 
in which it draws support, but essential to be seen to be legitimately representative 
and accountable by other actors, not least by media organisations …  
(Barnett, 2003, p. 12) 
As previously discussed, South African protesters are very conscious of the importance of 
drawing media attention to their protest (Tapela, 2013; Booysen, 2007). Gaining media 
attention for a protest is often crucial to put pressure on decision makers (Barnett, 2003), 
because through the media, protesters can demand the attention of powerful political actors. 
Also protest can lead to the media scrutinising the responses of powerful political actors to 
protest, and political actors are thereby subjected to a media logic (Hjarvard, 2008).  
But attracting media attention is not straightforward; in South Africa ‘everyday forms of 
community expression are mostly ignored by the media’ (Thompson & Nleya, 2010, p. 225). 
Therefore, to attract attention, protesters must engage in action that has ‘news value’ for the 
media (Barnett, 2003); more extreme and dramatic activities are more likely to attract media 
attention (Baylor, 1996). While the protesters may wish to deploy frames that ‘negotiate a 
shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 
615), the protesting community is only likely to get media attention by highlighting conflict 
and contention: conflict may be necessary to ensure a ‘maximum diffusion of information 
about social problems’ (Tichenor et al., 1999, p. 31). 
Protesters may therefore resort to violence to attract media attention; the protesters 
and surrounding communities may understand violence ‘as a language, a message, a way of 
calling out to higher authorities about the state of things … [and] a warning at the same time’ 
(Von Holdt & Kirsten, 2011, p. 27). But even though other communities may read protests in 
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a supportive way and go on to follow their example (Booysen, 2007), protesters’ efforts to 
exert influence and communicate do not necessarily get read and rewritten by the media in 
ways they would choose. Violent tactics are unlikely to elicit media support (Baylor, 1996) or 
indeed the desired support from other political actors.   
The ‘collective action frames’ through which communities try to show how they share 
similar concerns to those of broader society may therefore be at odds with the dramatic 
tactics needed to attract media attention. Hence, violent protests may be viewed as 
‘ambiguous and contradictory in their implications for citizenship and democracy’ (Von Holdt 
& Kirsten, 2011, p. 7). Because such ambiguity and complexity are at odds with the easily 
understandable story the media are trying to tell, the mainstream media may ignore efforts to 
explain protest and instead focus on the most spectacular aspects of the protest (Harlow & 
Johnson, 2011). So while protesters may need the media for ‘mobilization, validation, and 
scope enlargement’ (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993, p. 116), media coverage can be a double-
edged sword: protesters gain visibility, but their poverty and livelihoods struggles are likely to 
be, at best, presented superficially (Bullock et al., 2001).  
Through framing analysis, this study will explore the extent to which protesters’ 
collective action frames are taken up or ignored in media frames. This might reveal the 
extent to which protest is an effective tool for political communication in South Africa, and if 
so, which of the protesters’ frames are resonate most with other societal frames.  
 
3.5. Media framing in the South African political terrain 
Given the dearth of studies on media coverage of protest in South Africa, I looked at framing 
studies on topics related to protest, such as political life; violence; GEAR, neoliberalism and 
privatisation of public services; the Marikana massacre; HIV/AIDS (including protests on 
treatment provision); and environmental activism and protest in Durban. Various framing 
studies on different aspects of South Africa’s political life, have found for example, in the 
coverage of 2010 Soccer World Cup, class and racial features (Chuma, 2012), 
sensationalised coverage of school violence in a way that may prevents deep knowledge 
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and understanding (De Wet, 2012), and the perpetuation of neo-liberal discourse in the 
coverage of privatisation debates (Mayher & Mcdonald, 2007), conferring ‘legitimacy in the 
primacy of market led growth’ (Mudzamiri, 2009, p. 85). These examples reveal inter alia 
that class and race discourses are still very much part of the South African political terrain; 
despite widespread societal violence the media still does not offer any in depth 
understanding of the underlying causes; and discussions around economic matters are still 
very much dominated by the values of the economic elite. 
In the case of a frame analysis of South African media coverage of HIV/AIDS, Jacobs 
and Johnson (2007) found that the coverage focussed on the political battle between then 
President Thabo Mbeki and the Treatment Action Campaign, but did not provide sufficient 
information about treatment, services available, how provinces were rolling out care, etc. In 
addition, where activists protested the media was said to ‘display “ambivalence” when the 
poor do away with decorum, display unmediated anger and break with the law’ (Jacobs & 
Johnson, 2007, p. 143). The study also highlighted media deficiencies in terms of media’s 
support for GEAR and privatisation such that ‘it removes certain key economic policy issues 
from the public realm and from political debate’ (Jacobs & Johnson, 2007, p. 142). These 
limited and limiting frames were directly linked to ‘the very inequalities and democratic deficit 
that the media is expected to help correct’ (Jacobs & Johnson, 2007, p. 144). The HIV/AIDS 
framing study is particularly relevant for our current study on ‘service delivery protest’ in that 
it suggests that the coverage is likely to focus on political battles, lack context about service 
provision, display “ambivalence” to the violence and anger displayed by protesters, and fail 
to highlight the economic systems which underpin basic service delivery in South Africa’s 
poor townships. 
In a framing study of school violence, Jacobs (2014) found that the media tended to 
ignore the societal factors that contribute to violence, that official sources dominated the 
coverage, and that there was a lack of follow up articles. This suggests that the South 
African media may tackle violence as episodic and gruesome, but neither provide readers 
with an understanding of the sources of violence, nor an understanding from the perspective 
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of the victims or perpetrators of violence. With respect to this study on ‘service delivery 
protests’ this speaks to the possibility that violent protests might be covered with no deeper 
understanding of the causes, and without speaking to the perpetrators (protesters) directly. 
Jacobs (2014, p. 13) found that the coverage failed ‘to elicit social responsibility’ and 
promoted ‘civic indifference’. 
In a framing study of media coverage after  the Marikana massacre, van Baalen (2013) 
found that the dominant frame was government and elite denial that either government or 
the mining industry could be blamed in any way for the massacre. The second most 
dominant frame was more sympathetic to the protesters and victims as it placed emphasis 
on structural factors such as economic inequality and police brutality. This finding is 
particular relevant to the study of ‘service delivery protest’ frames, as it indicates that elite 
voices may dominate, but there is scope for alternative voices to emerge regarding the 
underlying factors leading to protest. 
Similarly, in my previous study of the Western Cape  farmworker strikes in South 
Africa, the media used both frames oriented against protesters as well as sympathy frames 
(that identified with the protesting workers) and solidarity frames (which pointed to ways in 
which the protesters could find common ground with those they were protesting against) 
(Pointer, 2013). This suggests that South African media coverage of protests might not be as 
one dimensional as revealed in studies of US and UK protests. 
While in the case of environmental activism and protest, Barnett (2003, p. 20) found in 
the media ‘significant opportunities for marginalised political actors to exert influence and 
assert their presence’, he acknowledges that the receptiveness to environmental activism 
may not be applicable to all forms of protest on all issues. While Barnett (2003) identifies 
opportunities for protesters in the media, the international literature has identified the 
dangers of these opportunities and thus we must be cautious to not simply take positive 
coverage at face value (Gitlin, 2003; Gamson et al., 1992; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Zald, 
1996). In the case of media coverage of environmental activism, it may simply portray 
hegemonic ideology meeting partial challenges and adapting (Gitlin, 2003).  
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Given the nature of ‘service delivery protests’ in South Africa, conflict is likely to give 
rise to increased media attention on the protests (Tichenor et al., 1999), but voluminous 
coverage is not necessarily favourable to the voices of protesters, not necessarily 
establishing ‘a sense of public legitimacy’, nor building the ‘standing in eyes of government 
and business’ (Barnett, 2003, p. 12). This study will explore the extent to which media 
framing of ‘service delivery protests’ ensures that the dominant culture of South African 




Exploring the interaction between South African ‘service delivery protesters’, the news media 
and other social actors, by analysing protest and media frames, can potentially help unpack 
aspects of the South African political terrain, expose how power is distributed among various 
social actors, and contribute to understanding the meaning of protest in the South African 
political terrain. While protesters are trying to communicate with the wider world, the 
strategies used to attract media attention may be at odds with the messages they are trying 
to communicate. Previous South African framing studies suggest that there are parallels and 
divergences from international framing literature on protests, and these will be explored 
further in subsequent chapters.  
  




This study involves a frame analysis of print media articles about ‘service delivery protests’ 
on the SA Media database from 1 January 2013 until 31 December 2013. In the literature 
there is no agreement on how to undertake a frame analysis (Chong & Druckman, 2007; 
D’Angelo, 2002; de Vreese, 2005; Entman, 1993; König, 2005; Matthes & Kohring, 2008; 
Matthes, 2012, 2009; Tankard, 2001), although various methods and approaches have been 
proposed and used. The controversy around how to undertake a frame analysis mainly 
revolves around the fact that ‘a frame is a quite abstract variable that is hard to identify and 
hard to code’ (Matthes & Kohring, 2008, p. 258), so empirically identifying frames is 
notoriously difficult (König, 2005). In the literature it is often unclear how definitions of 
framing were translated into a concrete methodology with operational steps (Matthes, 2009). 
Framing theorists argue a broad range of positions on methodology. On the one hand, 
some theorists argue for rhetorical analysis techniques, which ‘actively involves the 
personality of the researcher’ (Kuypers, 2010, p. 291) and is difficult to verify objectively 
(Kuypers, 2010). On the other hand, some theorists break down texts into various 
components (e.g. keywords for Entman (1993) and Miller & Riechert (2001), identified 
characters for van Gorp (2010), or topics and actors, risks, benefits, and responsibilities for 
Matthes & Kohring (2008)) and perform various types of cluster analysis including 
hierarchical cluster analysis, factor analysis, and latent class analysis. 
Regardless of the approach for identifying and counting frames, framing analysis 
studies the ‘process of constructing meaning’ (Gamson et al., 1992, p. 385) and typically 
‘identifies a problem that is social or political in nature’ (Johnston & Noakes, 2005, p. 5). 
Although there are ‘at least four locations of framing that can be studied: the communicator, 
the text, the receiver, and the culture’ (van Atteveldt et al., 2006, p. 3), this study will focus 
on news texts. The text is of particular interest, because the South African media has been 
accused of a middle-class bias, presenting ‘service delivery protests’ as ‘a violent and 
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mysterious set of event for which strange and presumably primitive people are responsible’ 
(Friedman, 2011, p. 112). Through a framing analysis of news texts, this study will unpack 
the ‘system of organized signifying elements that … indicate the advocacy of certain ideas’ 
(Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p. 55) and ‘constitute broader interpretative definitions of social reality’ 
(van Gorp, 2007, p. 63) with respect to ‘service delivery protests’ in South Africa. 
Framing analyses of news texts take as their starting point the idea that 
… journalists play an important role in constructing the news: choices about 
language, quotations, and relevant information lead to emphasis upon certain 
features of a news story and, in turn, significantly structure citizens responses to 
public events and issues by encouraging certain “trains of thought”. 
(Shah et al., 2002, p. 367) 
This study also assumes that ‘the repertoire of frames is, conceptually, situated largely 
externally of the individual’ (van Gorp, 2007, p. 62) and that ‘frames are tied in with … 
cultural phenomena’ (van Gorp, 2007, p. 65). However, unlike van Gorp (2007), in the South 
African context, I do not necessarily agree that these cultural phenomena are shared or that  
[t]he domain in which the news discourse operates consists of shared beliefs about
society. These beliefs … are known and accepted by a majority of the society as
common sense or conventional wisdom …
(my emphasis) (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p. 57) 
While exploring the extent to which there are shared cultural values in South Africa is 
beyond the scope of this study, frames are ‘controlling, hegemonic and tied to larger elite 
structures’ (Reese, 2007, p. 149) and contribute to ‘a structure of dominance’ (Gamson et 
al., 1992, p. 381). Framing may be considered a contest over how an issue is defined, 
pointing to which ideological principles and societal values are relevant (Pan & Kosicki, 
2001). Based on whose meanings are included and whose are not, frames signal power 
relations and create the illusion of the full story being told ‘by limiting the universe of possible 
social meanings’ (Durham, 2001, p. 130). 
As for others who have undertaken frame analysis, this study sees news texts as a set 
of ‘organized symbolic devices that will interact with individual agents’ memory for meaning 
construction’ (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p. 58). Frames reduce complex events to an easily 
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understandable whole by linking different elements of the story into a cohesive , plausible 
narrative (van Gorp, 2007). Media framing is ‘the process of culling a few elements of 
perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to 
promote a particular interpretation’ (Entman, 2007, p. 164).  
Since frames are ‘relatively comprehensive structures of meaning made up of a 
number of concepts and the relations among those concepts’ (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p. 
142) this frame analysis identifies concepts that point to particular frames. These could 
include ‘rhetorical devices such as metaphors, catch phrases, and imagery … reasoning 
devices that draw on causal attributions, consequences, and appeals to principle’ (Bullock et 
al., 2001, p. 233), but also ‘themes and subthemes, types of actors, actions and settings, 
lines of reasoning and causal connections, contrasts, lexical choices, sources, 
quantifications and statistics, charts and graphs, appeals (emotional, logical, and ethical)’ 
(van Gorp, 2010, p. 91). These manifest elements in the text function as ‘demonstrable 
indicators’ and are ‘framing devices’ (ibid).  
However, this study will not simply systematically identify the ‘loose elements’ of 
frames in the print media texts on ‘service delivery protests’; it will also explore ‘the impact of 
the implicitly present cultural phenomena conveyed by all the elements as a whole and 
relate them to the dynamic process in which social reality is constructed’ (van Gorp, 2007, p. 
72–73). Frames ‘are not singular persuasive messages or assertions … [but] always refer to 
a pattern involving interpretation, attributions, and evaluation’ (Matthes, 2012, p. 252). 
Therefore, while the manifest elements may guide identification of frames, only coding 
manifest content can lead to validity problems (Scheufele & Scheufele, 2010), so this study 
also identifies frames by reading between the lines, not just counting the manifest elements. 
This makes frame identification and the framing analysis somewhat subjective, which is ‘a 
distinctive characteristic of framing analyses’ (van Gorp, 2010, p. 103).  
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4.2. Research design 
Even though no uniform measurement standards exist for counting frames (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007), framing analysis usually consists of: 
1. identifying an issue or event for study; 
2. identifying a sample; 
3. generating a list of possible frames — inductively or deductively, with an explanation of 
how they might be identified (e.g. keywords, catchphrases, symbols); 
4. coding the articles; 
5. analysis (adapted from: Chong and Druckman, 2007; Tankard, 2001) 
This study used both quantitative and qualitative methods, with quantitative content 
analysis techniques being used to: 
1. measure and code the presence of frames in news texts; and 
2. count the various sources used in each news text. 
Qualitative techniques were then used in the analysis, drawing on discourse analysis, 
to explore the meaning of the frames present. Combining ‘the strengths of quantitative and 
qualitative textual analysis is seen as the best way to get “at” the complex, latent structures 
of meaning’ (D’Angelo, 2010, p. 360). Although initially framing studies mainly used 
qualitative and inductive techniques for analysis, over time data-based, quantitative studies 
using deductive frame-extraction and manual coding is on the rise and becoming common 
practice (Matthes, 2009). Van Gorp (2007, p. 72) argues that: 
The strongly abstract nature of frames implies that quantitative and qualitative 
research methods should be combined with the interpretative prospects of 
qualitative methods. 
Quantitative analysis will help identify the features ‘that when taken together, tell a larger tale 
than the manifest story’ (Reese, 2007, p. 152) by converting the textual materials into 
numerical values to determine the frequency and/or intensity of frames in a statistical way. 
Qualitative methods, including critical discourse analysis and rhetorical analysis, can help 
explore the ‘collective struggle over meaning’ (Vliegenthart & Zoonen, 2011, p. 112) taking 
place in print media coverage of ‘service delivery protests’; since analysing textual data in its 
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embedded context can help interpret data in ways that are lost in a purely quantitative study. 
By combining quantitative and qualitative techniques there is a trade-off, as ‘qualitative 
analysis offers higher validity of the findings but less reliability’ (Johnston, 2002, p. 69). 
 
4.2.1. Data collection and sampling 
The sample is drawn from the SA Media database over a one year period starting on 1 
January 2013 and ending on 31 December 2013; the most recent full year period was 
chosen in order to study the most contemporary period possible. The data was searched 
using the site’s search engine, using the search terms ‘service delivery protest’ and ‘protest 
march’. However, on checking these results for relevance, it was concluded that only those 
articles collected with the term ‘service delivery protest’ were relevant to the study, as 
articles under ‘protest march’ were of different types of protest (e.g. union marches, political 
party marches, protests related to court hearings, etc.). In total 55 articles were identified 
from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013. Fifteen (15) of the articles were from The New 
Age (a national daily), seven (7) were from the Daily Dispatch (a regional daily), the 
Diamond Fields Advertiser (a Kimberley local paper) and The Star (a regional daily) each 
carried five (5) stories, Witness (a regional daily) and the Daily News (a Durban local paper) 
both carried four (4) stories, three (3) were from The Times (a national daily), the Cape 
Argus (a regional daily) and the Pretoria News (a Pretoria local paper) each carried to 
articles, other newspapers (the Sunday Independent, the Independent on Saturday, the 
Cape Times, the Sowetan, the Express, the Citizen, Business Day, City Press, the Mail & 
Guardian) all carried one article each. 
 
4.2.2. Coding 
The literature on frame analysis identifies two possible approaches to coding frames, i.e. an 
inductive approach through which ‘frames emerge from the material in the course of 
analysis’ (de Vreese, 2005, p. 53) or a deductive approach which ‘investigates frames that 
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are defined and operationalized prior to the investigation’(ibid). This study sought to compare 
South African media frames on ‘service delivery protest’ with previous studies on media 
coverage of protests and social movements in the US and UK, therefore, both inductive and 
deductive techniques were used.  
First of all, using a deductive approach, I identified a list of possible frames from the 
literature, including literature on ‘service delivery protests’ in South Africa and framing 
literature, yielding the below table of frames: 
Table 1: Frames identified from the literature 
Frames from framing literature Frames from ‘service delivery protest literature’ 
contest frame democracy/citizenship frame 
injustice frame failed democracy/participation frame 
collective action frame corruption frame 
inconvenience frame a rights frame (includes human rights and 




law and order/criminal frame 
moral frame 
Because without criteria for identifying frames ‘assessment falls into a methodological 
black box’ (Matthes & Kohring, 2008, p. 260), I then identified a set of ‘framing devices’ (van 
Gorp, 2010) which could be used to help identify each frame. These devices include 
keywords, characterisations, sources, actions and settings. However these devices serve 
only as a guide — since frames are usually latent, ‘not spelled out in their entirety’3 (König, 
2005). While using framing devices avoids the problem of ‘dependence on the creativity of 
the frame analyst’ (König, 2005), in English words can have multiple meanings and contexts, 
so relying only on framing devices may result in false positive results for the presence of a 
frame. It is also possible that a frame may be clear without all of the devices being present. 
Therefore it is necessary to read for meaning, not simply search texts for particular framing 
devices. The aim was to identify ‘[a]ll conceivable framing devices that point at the same 
3 Available at:http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/methods/publications/frameanalysis/measurement.html 
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core idea [thus constituting] the manifest part of a frame package’ (van Gorp, 2007, p. 64) as 
follows: 
Table 2: Keyword guide to frames 
Frame Frame devices 
1. Contest Several sources who appear to disagree with each other 
2. Injustice unfair, not right, inequality, unequal, protesters 
characterised as victims 
3. Rights rights, constitution, protesters characterised as citizens 
with rights 
4. Collective action community, we, our, protesters characterised as 
community members united in action 
5. Inconvenience nuisance, obstacle, delays, traffic, obstacles 
6. Economic economy, cost, business, monetary sums 
7. War/ spectacle burning, bomb, shattered, smashed, attack, war zone, 
battle, trashed, violent, sometimes protesters 
characterised as young men 
8. Democracy/ citizenship democratic, democracy, citizens (tone positive) 
9. Failed democracy democratic, democracy, citizens (tone negative) 
10. Sympathy understandable, understanding, needs, protesters 
characterised as victims 
11. Accountability frame answers, answer, answering, public officials called on to 
answer 
12. Law and order/ criminality crime, criminals, criminality, law and order, restoring 
peace, police viewpoints 
13. Corruption corruption, corrupt, lack of transparency, misspending, 
public officials 
14. Moral frame value judgements like: disgraceful, appalling, abhorrent 
Guided by the above devices, articles were then manually examined to identify which 
of the frames were present. Manual coding ‘allows greater flexibility to discover new frames’ 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 108) and decreases the likelihood of false positives and false 
negatives, whereas computerised processes ‘miss a great deal of contextual information’ 
(Johnston, 2002, p. 78).  Each article was classified with 0 = frame not present; and 1 = 
frame present. I assumed that each article may contain more than one frame, and coded for 
that, rather than trying to identify and code ‘a dominant frame per news item’ (Matthes, 2009, 
p. 355), which would mean relying too much on the my interpretative capacity, and would
ignore how ‘many speakers actively engage in frame alignment processes … which 
presuppose the existence of more than one frame in a text’ (König, 2005). 
The above deductive frames ‘are limited to already established frames’ (Matthes & 
Kohring, 2008, p. 262). Since South African media may use different frames to those 
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identified in previous framing studies of protest in the US and UK, it is important to remain 
open to the possibility that other frames may exist in South African texts. Therefore, in the 
process of checking for the above frames, I remained flexible to ‘discover new frames that 
were not identified in the initial coding scheme’ (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 108); where 
this occurred, the frame was added to the list and articles were also classified with 0 = frame 
not present; and 1 = frame present. Although the increased flexibility of an inductive 
approach has ‘a potential cost of lower reliability’ (ibid), the deductive frames derived from 
the literature may not adequately cover the range of frames used in South Africa. Five new 
frames were identified during the course of coding, as follows: high prevalence; failed 
governance; factional interests; police action; and the need for dialogue. 
The articles were also coded in terms of sources used, with 1 = source present and 0 
= source not present. Sources were simply catalogued as they were found in the texts; in all 
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4.2.3. Analysis 
Because articles in the sample came from different newspapers, the analysis paid attention 
to which articles were from which newspaper, and noted similarities and differences in 
frames deployed by each newspaper, although only The New Age produced a big enough 
sample to draw any conclusions. 
Based on the above coding, the most prevalent frames and sources were identified. A 
hierarchical cluster analysis was then undertaken on the framing data using Ward’s method, 
to determine how different frames (or sources) were related to one another and to group 
together frames (or sources) that are as much alike as possible. Ward’s method hierarchical 
cluster analysis was done using the R statistical software environment with the hclust and 
pvclust packages.   
Given the members of a dataset, the cluster analysis sought to ‘group members with 
respect to many variables’ (Ward, 1963, p. 263) (e.g. the presence or absence of frames or 
sources). The resulting clusters represent classes, or conceptually meaningful groups of 
articles (Tan et al., 2005, p. 487). Since the number of clusters that best describes the data 
was not known from the outset, hierarchical cluster analysis involved multiple steps of 
grouping articles that are closely related to each other, reducing the number of groups at 
each step, until ‘a single all-encompassing cluster remain[ed]’ (Tan et al., 2005, p. 495). With 
regards to forming clusters, Ward’s method found articles that form a group where members 
are most similar to each other, and because of this property, it was ‘a good technique for 
identifying suitable cluster solutions’ in frame analysis (Matthes & Kohring, 2008). 
Ward’s method is a form of prototype-based hierarchical cluster analysis that seeks to 
reveal (frame or source) similarities between data objects (in this case articles) by creating a 
hierarchy of groups of articles (clusters). The method starts by considering clusters 
generated by each possible pairing of articles. Since the frames in each article were coded 
using a binary scheme (1 = frame present, 0 = frame not present) an “average article” was 
computed for each cluster. Knowing this “average article” (called a centroid in cluster 
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analysis) the compute the “scatter”: how much the articles in the cluster differ from this 
average. The cluster with the lowest scatter was then merged and the process began again. 
At each stage, new clusters were formed by combining existing clusters with each other and 
individual articles, computing the centroid, and finding the resulting new cluster with smallest 
scatter. This process continued until all articles were joined into a single final cluster. Then p-
values for each cluster were calculated using multi-scale bootstrap resampling (implemented 
by the pvclust package). When clusters are largely supported by the data they have high p-
values (Kabacoff, 2014).  
The results of the cluster analysis were graphically represented in a dendrogram (tree 
diagram), which revealed clusters and sub-clusters of frames (or sources) that are closely 
related to each other. For the frame clusters, the analysis identified thematic meta-frames for 
each cluster, exploring the political significance of these meta-frames. (The cluster analysis 
process for frames is shown in Appendix 1 and the cluster analysis for sources is shown in 
Appendix 2.) 
Once the cluster of frames and cluster of sources was established, the analysis went 
on to examine the relationship between the prevalence of frames and the prevalence of 
sources. I counted the number of articles where a frame was present, and then for each 
frame counted how often a particular source was used. The resulting ratios of sources to 
frames was used to generate a heat map (the rows (sources) and columns (frames) of the 
heat map were each clustered using hierarchical clustering with Ward’s method to illuminate 
where particular frames used similar sources and where particular sources are used in a 
similar collection of frames). 
Although it would be tempting to analyse only the dominant frames and sources (in 
each time period) for meaning, the analysis also paid attention to ‘social meanings that do 
not survive as frames’ (Durham, 2001, p. 127) — the ‘discarded “social narratives” or cultural 
meanings’ (Durham, 2001, p. 129) lying beneath the successful frames. Because ‘what is 
absent from a text is often just as significant from the perspective of sociocultural analysis’ 
(Fairclough, 1995, p. 2), the analysis looked at the interplay between what is included and 
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what is not included in the sampled new articles, in order to identify if and how the frames 
used are politically significant, if there are politically significant frames not used in the 
articles, and what the frames reveal about the organisation of power in relation to ‘service 
delivery protests’. 
The analysis refers to the dominance and subordination of frames (and sources) in 
terms of frequency used, but also used techniques of qualitative discourse analysis and 
rhetorical analysis to identify particularly salient examples of the frames in the news texts, 
and explore meaning in more depth. I agree with D’Angelo (2002, p. 872; 881) that ‘framing 
researchers should draw liberally from available theories’ and utilise ‘techniques found in 
content analysis and discourse analysis’. Rhetorical analysis is useful for exploring ‘the inner 
workings of a text’ Kuypers (2010, p. 295). By exploring the rhetorical and discursive 
processes in the news texts, frames can be tied to larger ideological structures (Steinberg, 
1998). The media ‘use rhetorical devices to invoke images, increase salience of a point, and 
increase vividness of a report’ (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p. 62). When applying frame analysis, 
rhetorical insight can help reveal why the frame is relevant and ‘bring the frame to life’ 
(Binder, 1993, p. 755). 
Several authors have noted the differences, similarities and relationship between 
discourse analysis and frame analysis (e.g. Fiss & Hirsch, 2005; Greenberg, 2002; 
Johnston, 2002; Pan & Kosicki, 1993) and pointed to usefulness of both in confronting ‘the 
difficult tasks of describing and presenting evidence for concepts that reside in the black box 
of mental life’ (Johnston, 2002, p. 63). In this study, discourse is understood as the 
‘summation of symbolic interchange … the interrelations of symbols and their systematic 
occurrence’ (Johnston, 2003, p. 218). At the simplest level discourse analysis reveals the 
scripts that are embedded in frames (Johnston, 2003), through ‘potentially ideological’ 
features including ‘features of vocabulary and metaphors, grammar, presuppositions and 
implicatures, … generic structure, and style’ (Fairclough, 1995, p. 2). If frames are mental 
structures, then ‘there is a fundamental relationship between the structures of mental life and 
the production of written or verbal discourse’ (Johnston, 2003, p. 220). Indeed, ‘discourse 
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and its intensity of contention result from the active, interested meaning creation by different 
actors vying for support for their respective positions’ (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005, p. 46).  
With respect to print media coverage of ‘service delivery protests’, the analysis 
examines how the news texts ‘define problems … diagnose causes … make moral 
judgements … and suggest remedies’ (Entman, 1993, p. 52). The analysis discerns the 
interplay of power and domination through frames and discourse, given that framing ‘plays a 
major role in the exertion of political power and the frame in a news text is really the imprint 
of power’ (Entman, 1993, p. 55). The framing analysis ‘pays close attention to the systematic 
study of political language’ (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p. 70) and explores the extent to which, for 
protesters, ‘making a conflict more public [i.e. through ‘service delivery protest] offers an 
opportunity … to improve its relative power’ (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993, p. 116). The 
analysis determines whether the print media articles advance the frames of political actors 
other than the protesters, and thereby helps ‘distribute political power to particular groups, 
causes, or individuals’ (Entman, 2007, p. 166). 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
This study incorporates quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis in an effort to overcome 
the problems that arise from using one or the other technique. The quantitative analysis 
ground the research in countable elements in the text, while the qualitative analysis explores 
the meanings of these countable elements, with particular attention to the political and/or 
ideological significance of the framing patterns found in the print media texts of ‘service 
delivery protests’. The study thereby explored how the production of news about ‘service 
delivery protests’ reflects systems of power in the South African political terrain. 
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This chapter presents the quantitative findings from the data coding and data analysis of 
South African newspapers’ framing of ‘service delivery protests’. In all, 55 newspaper articles 
were analysed, all published between 1 January 2013 and 31 December 2013. This chapter 
presents the frames used in the newspaper articles (identifying which are most prevalent), 
as well as the sources used in the articles. In the findings, I include results of the quantitative 
analysis of newspaper coverage of ‘service delivery protests’ and some qualitative 
observations about key features of the quantitative results. 
5.2. Results of frame analysis 
Prevalence of frames 
From the sample of 55 newspaper articles, the dominant frame (used in 33 articles, see 
Figure 1) was the war/spectacle frame, whereby ‘service delivery protests’ were framed in 
terms of burning, chanting, barricading, stone throwing and other similar activities 
undertaken by protesters. While this frame focussed on the actions of protesters, the police 
action frame (which was 5th most prevalent, used in 17 articles) highlights actions 
undertaken by police, e.g. shooting tear gas and rubber bullets, making arrests, and 
generally trying to disperse protesters. Cumulatively, these two frames amount to a strong 
focus on action in covering ‘service delivery protests’. 
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The second most prevalent frame found in the sample was the failed democracy 
frame, used in 28 articles. This frame focuses on the failure of community efforts to 
communicate effectively with local government officials — either because meetings 
disintegrated into fighting or because the protesters failed to get a meeting with local 
government officials. Alongside the fourth most common frame of failed governance, used in 
19 of 55 articles, the failed democracy frame creates a narrative of local government failing 
the people. The failed governance frame typically involves criticising government officials 
and/or political parties for their failure to limit or totally eradicate protest action. The failed 
democracy and failed governance frames correspond with some of the literature, which 
argues that ‘service delivery protests’ are a sign of a failed or failing state (e.g. Connolly, 
2014; Tapela, 2012; Tsheola et al., 2014). This runs counter to the sixth and seventh most 
prevalent frames — accountability and democracy — used in 13 and 12 articles respectively; 
these articles cite protesters arguing that they are acting to hold government accountable 
and that protest is an aspect of or enhances democracy.  
The third most common frame, used in 27 articles, is the law/crime frame, which cites 
various aspects of the law or refers to protesters as criminals. This frame typically asserts 
that ‘service delivery protests’ are unacceptable and should be prevented. The contrasting 
rights frame, is barely used (9 articles), which suggests that regarding legal framing, the 
criminality of protesters is asserted more often than the rights of protesters. 
Although the literature on Western media framing of protests finds the contest frame to 
be quite common (e.g. Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Mander, 1999; Semetko & Valkenburg, 
2000; Smilde, 2004; Tichenor et al., 1999), in this sample, the contest frame was only used 
in 11 articles, suggesting that articles tend to focus on one narrative or another, not 
narratives and counter-narratives. Similarly, although the literature suggests that corruption 
is often behind ‘service delivery protests’ (e.g. Banjo & Jili, 2013; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2012; Jili, 
2012; Koelble & Siddle, 2013b), this frame is also only used in 11 articles.  
Sample articles barely used economic frames (6 articles), while the literature on 
‘service delivery protests’ often identifies economics as the underlying cause of the protests 
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— either in terms of neoliberalism, privatisation and GEAR, or in terms of municipal 
indigency policies (e.g. Alexander, 2010; Bond & Mottiar, 2013; Hart, 2013b; Kunene, 
2014; Ngwane, 2011; Tissington, 2013; Tsheola, 2012). 
While ideally, the frame analysis would compare articles in different newspapers to 
explore any similarities and differences between the media sources, the bulk of the articles 
were sparsely spread across different newspapers, with the exception of the 15 articles 
covered by The New Age. Because The New Age relatively often covered ‘service delivery 
protests’, it is interesting to look at its particular framing of ‘service delivery protests’, as 
shown in Figure 2: 
Figure 2: Prevalence of frames in The New Age coverage of ‘service delivery protests’, 1 January 2013-31 
December 2013 
Given that the 15 articles in The New Age constitute 27.27% of the total sample, the 
prevalence of the war/spectacle frame and the law/crime frame is consistent with the overall 
sample, constituting 30,3% and 33,33% respectively of articles using those frames. 
However, it is notable that the accountability frame and the democracy frame are much more 
prevalent than in the general sample; indeed 69,23% of articles used the accountability 
frame and 66,67% of articles used the democracy frame in The New Age sample. This 
indicates that The New Age is as likely as other newspaper sources to use the war/spectacle 
frame and the law/crime frame, but much more likely to use frames suggesting that 
government is accountable, and democracy is working. The New Age is also much less 
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of such articles); it is also much less likely to deploy the failed democracy frame (constituting 
only 17,86% of such articles). 
Overall, the prevalent frames create the impression of superficial description with little 
deeper analysis or effort to understand the protests; where an explanation is given, the 
dominant explanations focus on the either the failed state (failed democracy and failed 
governance frames) or on the criminality of protesters. The New Age gives no clear reasons 
for protests, but frames the government as accountable and able to explain problems with 
service delivery. 
 
Hierarchical cluster analysis of frames 
A hierarchical cluster analysis of the frame data reveals the relationship between use of 
different frames (see Figure 3). The figures in red are the p-values. These results strongly 
link the war/ spectacle frame to the law/crime frame, the police action frame and failed 
democracy frame. This is the only cluster with really strong links between the frames, with a 
confidence score of 91.  
In the small number of articles using the economic frame, this frame is strongly linked 
(89 confidence score) to the inconvenience frame, with economics usually linked to the costs 
of protest damages, and not to wider economic analysis of the causes for protest. The 
hierarchical cluster analysis found a strong link between the failed governance and 
accountability frames (88 confidence score), and in the texts accusations of failed 
governance often lead to calls for government to be accountable. In articles using the 
corruption frame (11 articles), in just over half (6 articles) accusations of corruption are 
brought into doubt by representing arguments between different factional interests, 
muddying the waters with regard to whether or not corruption is actually taking place. The 
confidence score for other clusters of frames is fairly low (below 80% confidence that those 
clusters are accurate). 
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Figure 3: Hierarchical clustering of ‘service delivery protest’ frames 
For convenience, I have given each cluster a name, and the analysis will be discussed 
in terms of these clusters: the cluster made up of the war/spectacle, law/crime, failed 
democracy and police action frames is the ‘illegitimacy cluster’; the cluster around 
corruption, factional interests, accountability, failed governance, moral and high prevalence 
frames is the ‘failing state’ cluster; the cluster made up of collective action, sympathy, 
inconvenience, economic, democracy, contest and rights frames is called ‘weighing up 
protest’. The cluster around injustice and dialogue is very small, so as to render a detailed 
examination of these frames impossible; however, as this thesis aims to look at not only 
what frames are present, but also what significant frames are absent, the analysis in the next 
chapter contains a short discussion of the injustice frame. 
5.3. Results of source analysis 
Source prevalence 
The pattern of sources in the sample matches Western studies on the media framing of 
protest (e.g. Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Di Cicco, 2010; Harlow & Johnson, 2011; Hertog & 
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McLeod, 2001), in that elite sources dominate (see Figure 4) — particularly, local 
government officials (in 26 articles) and the police (in 20 articles), but also political party 
representatives (in 15 articles). Other elites are also represented in the sample, albeit at a 
much lower level. Elites include: national/ provincial government officials (7 articles), 
academics (7 articles) and editors (3 articles), business representatives (3 articles) (all of 
them in the transport sector, complaining about disruption to transport services), (white) 
farmers and farmer organisations (1 article), a single bureaucrat and single lawyer, and the 
Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela. 
Figure 4: Preferred sources used in newspaper coverage of ‘service delivery protests’, 1 January 2013–31 
December 2013 
By contrast, only 15 articles use protesters as a source. The sample also poorly 
represents those directly affected by the protests (although not necessarily protesters): only 
13 articles cite residents in the area where the protest took place, while 7 articles cite 
representatives of community-based organisations (CBOs). However, it is possible to argue 
that people near the protest are cited in 35 articles — cumulatively more than the times local 
government sources are used, albeit not more than the cumulative total of elite sources. 
Nevertheless, while the voices of protesters do not come across strongly, the voices of the 
poor do make a good showing in the sample. 
Given the prevalence of protests, it is surprising that the media has rarely relied on 
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protest’ or the protest trend. This suggests that ‘service delivery protests’ are very much 
treated as a local contest, with no real implications for South Africa as a whole. 
Number of sources per article 
The bulk (64%) of the 55 newspaper articles in the sample only used one or two sources 
(see Figure 5). Strikingly, 33% of articles used only one source. This correlates with the 
frames, in that since the war/spectacle frame was most prevalent, journalists often relied on 
their own observation and descriptive capacity, rather than on sources. 
Figure 5: Number of sources used in newspaper articles about ‘service delivery protests’, 1 January 2013–31 
December 2013 
However, an interesting pattern emerges when we look more closely at the articles 
that only used one source (see Figure 6): this group of articles was much less likely to use 
local government (1 article) and police (0 articles) sources, but did sometimes used 
protesters as the only source (3 articles). However, the bulk of the stories using only one 
source also rely on elite input, but more likely an academic/ researcher source (5 articles), or 
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When more than one source is used, however, the pattern reverts to the overall trend 
with local government and police sources dominating (see Figures 7, 8, 9 & 10). 
Figure 7: Sources chosen when two sources are 
used in ‘service delivery protest’ articles, 1 January 
2013–31 December 2013 
Figure 8: Sources chosen when three sources are 
used in ‘service delivery protest’ articles, 1 January 
2013–31 December 2013 
Figure 9: Sources chosen when four sources are 
used in ‘service delivery protest’ articles, 1 January 
2013–31 December 2013 
Figure 10: Sources chosen when five sources are used 
in ‘service delivery protest’ articles, 1 January 2013–
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Hierarchical clusters of sources 
Apart from the number of sources, I undertook a hierarchical cluster analysis to determine if 
clusters of sources commonly grouped together. The farmer, lawyer, Public Protector and 
bureaucrat sources were removed from the cluster calculation as they were insignificant and 
distorting the cluster analysis. Academic sources and editorial comment were strongly 
correlated, as were national/provincial government and unions, as well as local government 
and police (see Figure 11). 
 Figure 11: Hierarchical cluster of sources used in ‘service delivery protest articles’, 1 January 2013–31 
December 2013 
5.4. Correlation of frames and sources 
To understand the relationship between the prevalence of frames and the prevalence of 
sources, I counted the number of articles where a frame was present, and then for each 
frame counted how often a particular source was used. Based on the resulting ratios of 
sources to frames, I generated a heat map (the rows (sources) and columns (frames) of the 
heat map were each clustered using hierarchical clustering with Ward’s method to illuminate 
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where particular frames used similar sources and where particular sources are used in a 
similar collection of frames). 
The heat map reveals (see Figure 12) that articles used local government sources 
regardless of what frames were used. However, local government sources are most strongly 
correlated with frames of factional interest, contest and then rights, as well as democracy, 
accountability and the war/spectacle frames. Again, regardless of which frames are used, 
the police are commonly cited, but the police are most strongly correlated with frames of 
police action and economic costs. Political party representatives are most strongly correlated 
with the contest and corruption frames, while residents are most strongly correlated with the 
inconvenience frame. The high prevalence frame is strongly linked to academic/research 
sources, while the moral frame is most linked to editorial opinion, residents and CBO 
representatives. Protesters are most commonly linked with the democracy and police action 
frames. The law/crime frame is predominantly associated with local government and police. 
Figure 12: Heat map of ratio of frames to sources in articles on ‘service delivery protests’, 1 January 2013–31 
December 2013 
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5.5. Conclusion 
The results show a dominance of the war/spectacle frame, and a cluster of frames around 
this dominant frame, which emphasise the criminality of protesters and the negative impact 
of protests on democracy. There is not much coverage of the underlying causes of protests, 
particularly the economic circumstances driving protest. Elite sources dominate the 
coverage, and these tend to be local government and police sources, with provincial/ 
national government sources seemingly not having much to say on the issue. Nevertheless, 
the voice of the poor does get a look in, typically in a cluster with protesters, local 
government and/or police getting voice, but even occasionally with protesters used as the 
only source for a story. Many of the frames are not strongly linked with one source or 
another, but the dominant frame (war/spectacle) is most strongly correlated with local 
government sources, while the second most dominant frame strongly correlates with both 
local government and police sources. Several interesting patterns emerge from the data, 
which will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter. 
  




The media framing of ‘service delivery protests’ in South Africa shows some marked 
similarities to the framing of protests elsewhere, as identified in the literature. The similarities 
include favouring a war/spectacle frame, and a preference for elite sources over the voices 
of protesters. Apart from when only one source is used in a story (see Figure 6 on page 55), 
no matter how many sources are used, local government sources dominate (see Figures 7, 
8, 9 and 10 on page 55), giving such sources preferential treatment, and creating the 
impression that local government officials are the authority on ‘service delivery protests’. 
This is in line with other South African media research which has found that the media are 
‘dominated by official sources’ (Jacobs, 2014, p. 11) and has failed to develop a ‘pro-poor 
media vocabulary’ (Duncan, 2003, p. 10). However, what seems exceptional in the coverage 
of protests in South Africa, which is not mentioned in literature on Western media framing of 
protests, is the framing of protests in terms of a narrative of a failing state (i.e. the failed 
democracy and failed governance frames). In addition, while a large body of research on 
‘service delivery protests’ identifies economic factors underpinning protests (including 
neoliberalism, inequality and municipal indigency policies), underpinning economic factors 
hardly receive a mention in the media reports. 
This chapter will explore the above issues in more depth, making connections where 
possible, to other framing literature in South Africa. The chapter will explore the prevalence 
of frames in the coverage of ‘service delivery protests’, but will also explore the political 
significance of the framing. The overarching framework for discussing the political 
significance revolves around the unresolved issue of how power should be wielded in South 
Africa’s fairly new democracy — should political power reside mostly in state structures or in 
the hands of citizens, many of whom have voted for the ruling party, and what model does 
the media preference through framing? 
While I explore the frames in the sample, however, a caveat is that ‘service delivery 
protest’ is itself a frame — embodying several elements that recur throughout the newspaper 
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coverage in the sample. Other frames are embedded in the ‘service delivery protest’ frame, 
which originated in media coverage in 2005 (Modiba, 2005); previous to that highly local 
protests were not described under one banner. Calling a protest a ‘service delivery protest’ 
has the effect of tarring all local protests with the same brush. I argue that the term is used to 
undercut and downplay the variety of underlying factors leading to the protest, by deploying 
the frames that I will go on to analyse in this chapter.  
The structure of this chapter is based around the hierarchical cluster analysis of 
frames (see Figure 3 on page 52), and frames and sources are discussed within the context 
of clusters of frames. I have identified a theme prevalent in each cluster, and used the theme 
to identify each cluster. The cluster made up of the war/spectacle, law/crime, failed 
democracy and police action frames is the illegitimacy cluster; the cluster around corruption, 
factional interests, accountability, failed governance, moral and high prevalence frames is 
the failing state cluster; the cluster made up of collective action, sympathy, inconvenience, 
economic, democracy, contest and rights frames is called weighing up protest. The cluster 
around injustice and dialogue is very small, so as to render a detailed examination of these 
frames impossible; however, as this thesis aims to look not only at what frames are present, 
but also what significant frames are absent, this chapter contains a short discussion of the 
injustice frame. 
 
6.2. Street battles and illegitimacy 
In this cluster, one (strongly linked) sub-cluster is around the war/spectacle frame and the 
law/crime frame, while the other sub-cluster (more loosely linked) is around failed democracy 
and police action (see Figure 3 on page 52). The frames work together to delegitimise 
protest and highlight the dramaturgy of protest, rather than analysing what protests are 
about or giving voice to protesters. Throughout this cluster, police and local government 
sources dominate, so that these elite sources become ‘experts’ on ‘service delivery protests’, 
while the voices of protesters are delegitimised.  
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Vivid and criminal? 
Both the literature and the media link disparate protests by identifying commonalities, 
particularly superficially similar tactics and strategies deployed (as discussed in the 
literature by Alexander & Pfaffe, 2014; Alexander, 2010; Bond & Mottiar, 2013; Langa & 
Kiguwa, 2013). In the sampled media articles, the war/spectacle frame highlights the 
common strategies and tactics, often under the label ‘violent protest’ (e.g. Diale, 2013; 
Macupe, 2013; Motumi, 2013a; Phakathi, 2013). This ‘violence’ mostly involves simply 
barricading roads (usually with rocks, branches, burning tyres and/or burning debris) and 
property destruction (usually by burning). In 6 (of 55) articles sampled, the action extends to 
stoning police vehicles and passing cars (e.g. Editor, 2013b; Linden et al., 2013; Maimane, 
2013; Makhubu, 2013; Motumi, 2013a; Tau, 2013); but no other violence is reported, despite 
Lieutenant General Elias Mawela, Divisional Commissioner of Public Order Policing, 
reporting on 3 September 2014 that the number of violent protests in 2013 had increased 
(Mawela, 2014) (albeit that Mawela was not necessarily referring solely to ‘service delivery 
protests’). In focussing on the supposed violence of the protests, ‘[t]he superficial and 
sensationalised nature of the majority or articles may … prevent deep knowledge’ (De Wet, 
2012, p. 29). 
The focus on the war/ spectacle frame is not unusual; literature on protest coverage in 
the Western world also finds that the media focuses on ‘tactics, spectacles and dramatic 
actions’ (Harlow & Johnson, 2011, p. 1359). Arguably this frame results because ‘news 
involves the novel event, not the underlying, enduring condition’ (Gitlin, 2003, p. 263). The 
media bring home to us otherwise inaccessible social conflict by highlighting ‘conflict’s tenor, 
urgency, and immediacy’ (Mander, 1999, p. 3). 
 The war/spectacle frame creates an impression of the protesters as irrational, simply 
following what the Editor of The Star on 17 October calls ‘macabre dance steps’ (Editor, 
2013c). Protesters are variously described as ‘angry’ (e.g. Hartley, 2013), ‘irate’ (e.g. 
Plaatjie, 2013), ‘furious’ (e.g. Mokoena, 2013a), ‘outraged’ (e.g. Mgaqelwa, 2013), and 
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‘baying for blood’ (e.g. Mokoena, 2013a). The emphasis on protesters’ emotions heightens 
and manipulates ‘perceptions of threat’ (Zald, 1996, p. 272) from irrational, frenzied mobs. 
The discourse underpinning this frame is that conflict is dysfunctional: while readers may be 
sympathetic to the protesters’ poverty, the war/spectacle frame makes protesters less 
sympathetic, providing only vague explanations of the cause of protests, so that it is difficult 
to understand what is driving protests. If, as Entman (1993) argues, frames are in part about 
defining problems, the war/ spectacle frame identifies the protest itself as the problem, rather 
than underlying issues that drive protesters to the streets, so protests are an ‘actual 
disruption of legitimate order, not … a statement about the world’ (Gitlin, 2003, p. 271).  
As shown in Figure 3 on page 52, the war/spectacle frame is clustered with a 
law/crime frame, emphasising the criminality/illegality of the protesters. For example, in 
Durban’s Daily News on 17 April, ‘the illegal gathering only served to fuel the anger of the 
community,’ (my emphasis) (Peters, 2013); and in the Witness on 4 June, ‘when there are 
criminal elements we need to investigate,’ (my emphasis) (Ngqulunga, 2013c). Framing 
protests as illegal and hijacked by ‘criminal elements’ delegitimises the protest and 
suppresses protesters’ complaints: protesters are not sympathetic people seeking human 
living conditions, but unsavoury criminals trying to take what is not legitimately theirs. 
Even when protesters are not directly accused of criminal activity, crime is sometimes 
seen as a by-product of protest, or linked to protest, for example, in The Star on 13 March, 
‘Nkosi said the blockades had also resulted in an increase in criminal activities,’ (Motumi, 
2013b). And in The New Age on 26 March, a bus company spokesperson reportedly says 
‘we are worried that criminal activities might start [due to the protests]’ (Masilela, 2013). 
Similarly, in the Pretoria News  on 9 August, ‘[i]llegal electricity and water connections are 
common in the area’ (Tau, 2013). Framing a link between protesters and criminals implies 
either that protesters are criminals or that they have a shared agenda — defeating the ends 
of justice. This negates the injustice inherent in protesters’ poverty and negates their calls for 
a more just distribution of services. 
Rebecca Pointer PNTREB001 University of Cape Town FAM5006W: Minor Dissertation 
  63 
 
Do police actions indicate a failing democracy? 
In this same cluster, and extending the dramaturgy of the war/spectacle frame, articles 
commonly use the police action frame (17 of 55 articles), with police often the main sources 
in such articles (see Figure 12 on page 57), allowing police to define the reasons for their 
own actions. Police and protesters are framed as adversaries, since police action is often 
(14 of 17 articles) framed as being a response to disruptive actions taken by the protesters, 
rather than protest violence responding to police action, as described in the literature (e.g. 
Alexander & Pfaffe, 2014; Kunene, 2014; Mchunu & Theron, 2013). For example, in the 
Pretoria News on 19 April: 
About 10 people were arrested in the morning for alleged public violence and 
malicious damage to property. … Metro spokesman Elias Mahamba said the 
situation had spun out of control, forcing police to use rubber bullets and tear gas. 
(my emphasis) (Makhubu, 2013) 
And in The New Age on 14 May, ‘Petros said police were forced to deploy more 
officers and extra resources to control residents during service delivery protests’ (my 
emphasis) (Ramothwala, 2013a). The frame suggests that the police had no choice but to 
use force; force is the only remedy to ‘service delivery protests’ and the illegal and ‘irrational 
violence’ of protesters. This takes the responsibility off the police’s shoulders and squarely 
blames protesters for protest violence. Sometimes the descriptions of police action even 
become quite lyrical, for example, in the Saturday Star on 20 April: 
Cold rain fell past the swishing blades of a police helicopter; past the arc of the 
flash grenade, down on to the heads of protesters as they turned and fled. A small 
explosion and a smattering of rubber bullets followed them. 
(Olalde & Makhetha, 2013) 
The description creates the impression that forceful attacks on protesters are not even 
carried about by police per se, but by unpiloted helicopters, arcing flash grenades, and 
rubber bullets that ‘follow’ protesters. The police attack on protesters is simply a force of 
nature, like the rain, with attacks on protesters happening without human intent or decisions 
being made. 
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Nevertheless, police actions are not framed as entirely innocent in the whole sample; 
several articles frame police action in terms of negative outcomes, for example when a 
schoolgirl is shot dead, the Daily News on 3 October reports: 
Nqobile Nzuza, who her family said was an innocent bystander in a housing 
protest by shack dwellers, was shot in the back on Monday, allegedly by police 
after protesters mobbed their van. 
(Mlambo, 2013a) 
In Bekkersdal, the Star on 16 October frames police action as fairly indiscriminate, 
riding hippos through the streets ‘and wherever they would find a crowd, regardless of 
whether residents were armed with rocks or not, fired at them with rubber bullets’ (Motumi, 
2013a). In an editorial on 17 October, the Star is scathing: 
All there is, is a police force that is becoming as feral and as brutal as the blue line 
that propped up the apartheid regime. The weapons are the same, the uniforms are 
the same, the tactics are the same — the only difference is that the officers and 
members today have grown up in the very communities they now try to suppress. 
(Editor, 2013c) 
The discourse framing police action as problematic suggests that this is an organ of 
state that is failing to act appropriately; in identifying the inappropriate action, the media has 
an alternative in mind — a specific role that the police should play. For example, in the City 
Press on 21 April sponsors a mediation specialist, arguing that the police should collaborate 
with mediation specialists, be informed by academic research, apologise for past mistakes, 
train police officers to listen and build relationships, and reorient police towards de-
escalation (Spies, 2013); such arguments are quite prescriptive and do not include 
protesters’ voices about what roles they would like to see government officials (like the 
police) playing. 
The framing of failed police action goes alongside the framing of local government’s 
‘failed democracy’ (see Figure 3 on page 52), as failing participation is often the only 
explanation for the protests taking place (28 of 55 articles). This media frame mirrors 
research on ‘service delivery protests’, which argues that while the government has put in 
place Integrated Development Planning (IDP) and Ward Councils to facilitate participatory 
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democracy at local government level (Tsheola, 2012), the failure of these structures are 
leading to ‘service delivery protests’ (e.g. Nyar & Wray, 2012; Sinwell, 2011; Thompson, 
2011; Tsheola, 2012).  
Some media articles frame meetings between communities and councillors, mayors or 
other local government officials, which end in community dissatisfaction. For example, in 
East London the Daily Dispatch on 21 March highlights how ‘[t]he meeting was about service 
delivery and the councillor’s conduct but the mayor left before the issues had been 
addressed and the people were not pleased’ (Plaatjie, 2013). Similarly, the Pretoria News on 
9 August reports that in Protea South protesters said they had been holding meetings with 
government officials since 2010, but the only thing they have to show are meeting ‘minutes 
in which we were fed what have now become empty promises’ (Tau, 2013). In Kimberley, 
the Diamond Fields Advertiser on 5 June reports: 
Chaos erupted when Ntlhangula [the mayor] told the protesters to appoint five 
people to represent them, pointing out that she would not tolerate the noise and 
shouting … The unhappy residents, however, pointed out that they all wanted to 
voice their unhappiness because each one had his or her own problems and 
grievances … As their councillor tried to calm them down, Ntlhangula walked 
away. 
(Halata, 2013) 
In other cases, the problem was that meetings between councillors and residents did 
not take place at all, for example, in an editorial on 7 May, a Daily Dispatch editorial 
bemoans the breakdown of local participatory government systems in East London, and 
argues that communities often ‘do not even know who represents them at council’ (Editor, 
2013b). Similarly, the Star gives Op-ed space to the DA premier candidate for Gauteng to 
complain that protesters ‘tried and tried again to meet the member of the mayor committee 
(MMC) for housing in the city … they tried to meet the regional head of housing … it became 
clear the MMC wanted to avoid them’ (Maimane, 2013). 
The frame around ‘failed democracy’ gives credence to protesters claims and 
highlights that, in fact, protests are understandable given that local participatory structures 
are not working effectively. However, this places protest in a false dichotomy with 
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participatory democracy — it suggests that the only legitimate reason to protest is that 
‘legitimate’ structures of democracy are failing residents. The structures put in place by 
government in which citizens are invited to participate are framed as preferential to any 
spaces citizens might invent for themselves; invented and invited spaces are configured ‘in 
binary relations and tend to criminalize the latter by designating only the former as the 
“proper” space for civil participation’ (Miraftab, 2006, p. 195).  
The failed democracy frame gives preference to the invited space, ignoring how 
‘routinization of community participation depoliticizes communities struggles and extends 
state control within society’ (Miraftab, 2009, p. 34). For example, the Daily News on 17 April, 
sponsors the mayor’s insistence on formal structures of engagement: 
[Mayor Chris] Ndlela listened to the complaints of the irate residents and said he 
was willing to address their issue, but they would have to follow the proper 
channels. … “There is a proper way to resolve these disputes. The proper channels 
must be followed so that an amicable solution can be reached,” Ndlela said … 
(Peters, 2013) 
A Daily Dispatch editorial on 7 May opines that councillors ‘are the link between the 
community and council and should, ideally, be located in their designated areas and 
providing feedback on any developments or delays’ (Editor, 2013a). This view is quite 
prescriptive about how democracy should function; it imagines specific roles for particular 
actors in a technocratic way, ignoring what kinds of participation the protesters want. The 
implication is that protesters should be satisfied with the prescribed structures, as long as 
they function in the prescribed way. It is not made clear where these prescriptions come 
from, and there is no critique about whether such technocratic models will indeed satisfy 
protesting citizens. Such views are not confined to newspapers; in the Business Day on 
1 November, President Zuma verbally tries to foreclose on communities using their own 
invented structures to bring about change, saying that disruptive protests ‘have no place in a 
democracy like ours, which provides space for people to state their views openly and freely’ 
(Phakathi, 2013). Zuma’s framing implies that state structures are adequate in giving people 
a voice, and invented spaces are unnecessary.  
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This ‘failed democracy’ frame suggests that government only need listen if citizens 
follow the proper channels and that amicable solutions are only possible if communication 
happens within government-prescribed procedures. Assuming that invited spaces can or 
should replace people’s own invented spaces ignores the history of civic organisations in 
South Africa, which saw the need for civic organisations to ‘remain independent from and not 
participate in state structures’ (Seekings, 2000b, p. 54). Indeed, given that many ‘service 
delivery protesters’ draw a connection to the anti-apartheid struggles of the past (Langa & 
Kiguwa, 2013; Von Holdt & Kirsten, 2011; Zuern, 2011), relegating democracy only to invited 
spaces ignores the foundations of civic participation in South Africa by which ‘[d]emocracy is 
not only about formal institutions and processes, but must include a political culture which 
allows for dissent’ (Cherry, 2000, p. 106). 
While the media and some analysts argue that ‘service delivery protests’ suggest that 
‘municipalities have not as yet adequately democratized’ (Tsheola et al., 2014, p. 402), this 
ignores how organising and creating their own spaces for political engagement allows 
protesters to recover agency and feel empowered (Ngwane, 2011). Since the civic 
imagination was for organisations independent of state organs, the failures of the South 
African state may be because they try to impose government-created, invited spaces, rather 
than connecting with peoples’ own created structures that they feel best represent them.  
Indeed, communities seem to experience buck-passing and powerlessness in invited 
spaces; for example in the Diamond Fields Advertiser on 28 May: 
Ward 31 councillor, Moses Nhlapo, said yesterday that it was the officials at the 
municipality who were to be blamed for the protest because they were not doing 
their part to fast-track service delivery to residents … “We report these problems 
to the municipality and I am open to you. You can go to the municipality to 
scrutinise my reports there. I cannot do much if the officials delay in implementing 
issues.” … 
(Mokoena, 2013b) 
However, the invited spaces may not necessarily be moribund only because of local 
politicians’ failures (as suggested by the ‘failed democracy’ frame), but because invited 
spaces have limited decision-making powers, so ‘local politicians find themselves perched 
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precariously on seismic faultlines, confronted with direct and urgent demands for 
redistribution in the face of fiscal austerity and protections of white privilege’ (Hart, 2002, 
p. 235). Indeed, although ‘local government has been elected, it does not have the power to 
determine key development decisions, and is therefore unable to call upon civil society to 
influence state policy’ (Sinwell, 2011, p. 371).  
Even in those articles using failed democracy frames, police sources, followed by local 
government sources still dominate (see Figure 12 on page 57). So even when tackling failed 
participation as a source of community frustration, protesters are still not a preferred source. 
This suggests that local government and police are winning the framing contest, 
emphasising ‘the news media’s relationship to political authority’ (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, 
p. 224). In spite of taking part in protests to make their issues known, and despite adopting 
strategies with ‘an appropriate “value” to news organisation’ (Barnett, 2003, p. 11), the 
protesters preferred definition of their issues is mostly invisible, and the reasons underlying 
the protest are lost (Harlow & Johnson, 2011). Even when articles frame how democracy 
may be failing protesters, official sources dominate, and the efforts of protesters to find 
alternative routes to voice their concerns mostly fail. The frames in this cluster feed into a 
meta-narrative about the unresolved question of power in South Africa — in this cluster, the 
frames clearly suggest that state institutions should act to defuse community power in their 
own invented spaces (the space of protest) and community power should be redirected into 
the formal, invited, albeit better functioning, spaces. If communities instead use their own 
invented spaces, they can expect to be criminalised and face forceful police action. 
 
6.3. Is the state failing? 
The fragile state cluster is not as prevalent as the illegitimacy cluster already discussed; but 
in this cluster, the media take up a distinctive political position, criticising the government. In 
the strongest sub-cluster (see Figure 3 on page 52) some of the media in the sample 
highlight failed governance, while others (notably The New Age) strive to show the 
government as accountable; in the next strongest sub-cluster, the frames focus on 
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corruption and factional interests; and in the final sub-cluster the focus is on the high 
prevalence of protest and moralising about protest. 
 
Failing to govern or accountable and delivering? 
This cluster is markedly different to Western studies of media framing of protests, which 
routinely adopt ‘the main frames from the political elites, without changing their substantive 
nature’ (Matthes, 2012, p. 256). Instead, using the failed governance frame, the media 
underscore the idea that government is failing in its duties, broken and collapsing. Instead of 
relying on the elites of the elected political party, in using the failed governance frame, the 
media turns to other elites — opposition political parties, academics and other experts, and 
its own editorial opinion. 
Most often, the failed governance frame conveys opinions, using only one source in 
many of the articles (9 of 19) — so unsupported opinion is commonplace when framing 
failed governance in the sample. For example, in an Op-ed in the City Press on 21 April, a 
mediation practitioner, Chris Spies argues that ‘interaction between protesting residents and 
local councillors, national government and police seems to indicate a widespread collapse of 
systems and structures’ (my emphasis) (Spies, 2013). The argument is that the very fact of 
‘service delivery protests’ indicates a collapsing, failing government. This framing of a failing 
government is echoed in the Cape Argus on 5 November when it cites a member the 
Economic Freedom Fighters, arguing that ‘service delivery protests’ are ‘a symptom of how 
government over the past 20 years has failed the marginalised masses’ (Meyer, 2013). The 
Daily Dispatch on 18 April allows the leader of the United Democratic Movement, Bantu 
Holomisa, space to argue that ‘[p]eople are starting to say they have been forgotten by this 
government’ (Ntshobane, 2013). While the Star on 30 August creates space for the Leader 
of the Official Opposition in Johannesburg City Council, Mmusi Maimane, to opine that 
‘service delivery protests’ are due to a government that ‘couldn’t care enough to listen’ and 
does not have ‘brave leaders, who can speak to communities truthfully’ (Maimane, 2013). 
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In all of these articles, the ‘service delivery protests’ are framed as being due to 
failures of the ruling party. While there is nothing strange in political parties critiquing the 
ruling party, it is noticeable that the media sponsor such views, but do not sponsor the views 
of the ruling party on protest (except in the case of The New Age). While it is impossible to 
discern from the coverage that the media supports one or the other political party, choosing 
to primarily convey the frames of opposition parties, does indicate that the media are taking 
an anti-ruling party political position.  
On the one hand, the failed governance frame can be seen as sympathetic to 
protesters, but protesters cited do not use this frame, so it seems that the frame is putting 
words in protesters’ mouths. While the media mainly reports protesters using the democracy, 
police action and collective action frames (see Figure 12 on page 57), the media, through 
editorial and select political opinion, inserts the failed governance frame as if it is speaking 
on behalf of protesters. So, for example, in The New Age on 24 October Public Protector 
Thuli Madonsela argues that ‘service delivery protests’ display ‘the diluted trust that 
communities have in authorities who are supposed to serve them’ (Radebe & SAPA, 2013). 
These sponsored frames are underscored by editorials; for example, a Star editorial on 
17 October argues that: 
The 20th anniversary of our democratic miracle is no cause for celebration for them 
[protesters], but a nagging abscess that reminds them every day of the gulf 
between what they hoped for (and in many cases have been promised) and the 
situation in which they find themselves.  
(Editor, 2013c) 
Here, the Star editor claims to understand the protesters, arguing that the end of 
apartheid is for protesters ‘a nagging abscess’, and they do not celebrate the end of 
apartheid. Nowhere in the sample of articles on ‘service delivery protests’ do protesters 
themselves express such deep dissatisfaction with the new democracy, but the editor 
imagines this must be true, simply because protests are taking place. The editorial goes on 
to call for leadership from the President, because ‘our country is burning’ (Editor, 2013c). 
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This vein of a lack of leadership is also picked up in a Daily Dispatch editorial on 25 January, 
which opines that: 
Our government just never learns. … Even though many areas around the country 
have been rocked by service delivery protests in the past few years, we still do not 
know how to respond swiftly in dealing with these riots. … Sadly, our government 
has again failed to provide the kind of leadership that would have dealt with these 
issues head on and before they got out of hand. 
(Editor, 2013b) 
The clear tenor of this editorial is that the government is failing to provide leadership 
because it does not act strongly enough to suppress, limit and contain protest; ‘service 
delivery protests’ are not seen as the normal political activity of communities finding voice, 
but abnormal events that must be quelled. Again, as in the failed police action frame and the 
failed democracy frame, the media are quite prescriptive about what roles government 
should play, as if there is some ideal form that government must live up to. This framing 
treats an end to protest as the only appropriate political solution, and since the government 
is failing to end protest, it is a failure. So even though protest arises in part because it is 
strongly tied to South African political culture (see e.g. Matlala & Bénit-Gbaffou, 2012; 
Netswera & Kgalane, 2014; Twala, 2014), the media deems the culture problematic. 
Accordingly, the only appropriate way for citizens to voice their displeasure is to ‘forfeit the 
cornerstones of its insurrectionary inheritance’ (Adler & Steinberg, 2000, p. 10). And the only 
way for the President and government to act is to bring an end to protests: anything less is a 
failure of governance.  
However, this failure is not attributed to, for example, a system failing to alleviate 
poverty, but instead to the personal, individual ‘lack of leadership’ among elected party 
officials, including the president. While much of the literature attributes ‘service delivery 
protests’ to a failure of the neo-liberal doctrine that has dominated South African policy post-
apartheid (e.g. Alexander, 2010; Cheru, 2001; Jili, 2012; Kunene, 2014), the media are silent 
on the economic situation underpinning protesters’ lives. Previous studies have shown that 
the media support neoliberal economic policies (Jacobs & Johnson, 2007; Mayher & 
Mcdonald, 2007; Mudzamiri, 2009), but in discussing ‘service delivery protests’ the economic 
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factors contributing to the problem are invisible, implying that the media does not connect 
protest to economic factors. This blindspot suggests that the media are unwilling to critique 
the government’s economic policy, although it is willing to criticise the government on purely 
personal merits of ‘poor leadership’. This ignores how the government is, in fact, 
successfully imposing neoliberal policies, by successfully limiting the number of citizens who 
can access state support — through limited free basic services (McDonald & Pape, 2002; 
Van Heusden, 2012; Veriava, 2014; von Schnitzler, 2008), through limited indigency policies 
(Hart, 2013a; Tissington, 2013), and through limiting social grants (Meth, 2006). Hence, 
while the newspapers lament the state failure, state success (in applying neoliberal 
bureaucracy) may be at the heart of protest.  
Indeed, when one looks at the related accountability frame (which mainly comes from 
The New Age coverage of ‘service delivery protests’ (see Figure 2 on page 50)), we find the 
state, through its local government organs, grappling with the complexities of service 
delivery. In these articles, The New Age is at pains to show government as responsive to 
protesting communities. For example, on 29 April an article entitled ‘Houses in pipeline after 
protests’ details, in quotes from a Johannesburg city official, specific timelines of service 
delivery that has already taken place, service delivery that is scheduled, as well as the 
‘appointment of an architect to design houses and civil engineers to install roads and storm 
water drains and implement water and sewers’ (Ramothwala & Pongoma, 2013). And on 
10 May, it carries an article in which a Johannesburg city official insists that ‘the formalisation 
process for the township was at an advanced stage and was expected to be completed by 
September’ (Ramothwala, 2013b). Most of these articles do explain that there are delivery 
delays, but go on to show that service delivery is planned and moving forward.  
This deviation from the frames of other newspapers in the sample is striking, in that 
they show a government at work, as opposed to other newspapers which frame governance 
failures. However, this deviation is hardly surprising given that The New Age is known to be 
more supportive of the government (e.g. the Mail&Guardian article on 9 January 2011 (Staff 
Reporter, 2011) and to only criticise the government in a constructive way (as described in 
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the ‘about us’ section of its website (The New Age, 2014)). What is striking though, is how 
little other newspapers are inclined to use similar sources to examine government 
accountability.  
Given that ‘the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power’ (Entman, 1993, p. 
55), the playoff between the failed governance frame and the accountability frame in the 
different media sources in the sample, marks a political struggle between the experts, 
opposition parties and editors on the one hand, and the official government sources (used in 
The New Age coverage) on the other. Interestingly, the pattern of coverage in The New Age 
is quite similar to Western media framing, in that its frames are ‘in synchrony with the status 
quo’ (Johnston & Noakes, 2005, p. 6). But where other media sources break from typical 
framing (found in Western studies) there is a clear political agenda of critiquing the 
government, and this indicates that the media (other than The New Age) are asserting a 
different form of political power in South Africa. The media frames covering South Africa 
‘service delivery protest’ point to a media (apart from The New Age) which is markedly 
opposed both to the status quo (elected government) and to those who act to challenge the 
status quo (protesters). The South African state and the South African culture of political 
participation are framed as ‘deviance and aberration’ (Osaghae, 2007, p. 692).  
 
Corrupt government officials fighting factional battles 
The corruption frame and the factional frame continue from the failed governance frame in 
building a narrative of state failure. Since there is ‘no value-free way’ to define corruption 
(Harrison, 2006, p. 26), the corruption frame in the sample underscores South Africa as a 
site of ‘mal-governance and poverty as well as violent contestations of citizenship and 
statehood’ (Osaghae, 2007, p. 693). In using the corruption frame, the media sample simply 
treats it as one problem in a shopping list of ‘failing state’ arguments (unlinked to structural 
problems), for example, in the Daily Dispatch on 18 April: 
Some major grievances were:  
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 Appointment of incompetent staff in the two municipalities;  
 Irregularities in tender procedures;  
 Nepotism; and  
 Corruption. 
(Ntshobane, 2013) 
Similarly, in The Times on 17 September, a catalogue of residents’ frustrations is 
provided, including ‘unmet expectations for water services, lack of accountability by 
municipal officials, corruption, indifference, lack of monitoring and censure of non-
compliance by water services authorities and officials’ (my emphasis) (Mouton, 2013). While 
corruption is mentioned, no examples are given and mostly there is no further investigation 
of the corruption charges, even when more specific types of corruption are elaborated. For 
example The New Age on 30 September reported: ‘The fact that people serving on the ward 
committees are also working on the projects aimed at developing the township and its 
people calls for concern.’ (Tlhakudi, 2013). And in the Daily News in Durban on 3 October, 
while the DA’s George Mari calls for investigation of ‘allegations of unlawful evictions, illegal 
contractors, unfair allocations of houses and other-corruption based activities’ (Mlambo, 
2013a), no further investigation takes place. 
 Indeed allegations of corruption seem worthy of a mention, to reveal government 
failures, but do not seem to warrant further investigation to ascertain validity. Claims of 
corruption are mostly correlated with political party sources (see Figure 12 on page 57), but 
even others making corruption allegations do not present evidence. Only in one instance — 
in the Saturday Star on 20 April does the corruption frame seem to hold any weight: 
Anger has recently boiled over in this community after government corruption was 
exposed. … These include financial invoices and account audits that reveal 
massive overtime payments given to government employees and subcontractors, as 
well as misuse of municipality funds. 
(Olalde & Makhetha, 2013) 
The general accusation of corruption with only one example of actual investigation to 
back it up, allow the corruption frame to be embedded in the ‘service delivery protest’ frame, 
without proof. The assumption underpinning the corruption frame is that corruption is so 
Rebecca Pointer PNTREB001 University of Cape Town FAM5006W: Minor Dissertation 
  75 
 
widespread and so much part of local government operations that it can be stated, 
uncontested, without needing supporting evidence. In part, the media are allowing the 
corruption frames because protesters are reporting corruption, but South African protesters 
may also label practices as corruption simply because bureaucratic processes are clumsy, 
opaque, confused and capricious (Rubin, 2011). Since the media (and the academic 
literature) does not explore allegations of corruption any further to determine the truth of the 
claims, however, the corruption frame links media articles on ‘service delivery protests’ to 
international discourses on corruption in Africa. 
Corruption claims are highly political — ‘publicly calling a person or government 
corrupt is a political act’ (Bukovansky, 2006, p. 185). The frame assumes that corruption is 
‘the cause of democratic and development problems rather than a symptom or consequence 
of them’ (Szeftel, 1998, p. 238). It is as if corruption is so obviously a fault of the South 
African government that no evidence is needed to make such claims.  
While the sample does not particularly suggest that corruption is because South Africa 
is an immature society that needs to be tutored by more enlightened institutions and 
societies (Brown & Cloke, 2004), the link between corruption and factionalism does 
underscore an “immaturity” of government officials. The faction frame shows various local 
government role players squabbling (the faction frame most often correlates with local 
government sources — see Figure 12 on page 57), for example, in the Daily Dispatch on 
21 March: 
Ward 28 ANC Youth League chairman Xolisa Jita claimed residents were not 
happy with the outcome of the meeting with Ncitha. … Jita added that after Ncitha 
left at about 8pm residents started venting their anger on the streets. … The Sanco 
chairwoman of the area, Nokwanda Kalana, disputed that Ncitha left without 
making any resolutions at the meeting … Kalana added most residents had no 
problem with the councillor. 
(Plaatjie, 2013) 
In this article, the faction frame highlights community disagreements between ANC 
youth, and (presumably older) ANC members in Sanco. This points to the media again 
framing a failing, dysfunctional state, whereby people are unable to resolve their differences 
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‘maturely’ through democratic processes, but resort to ‘violent’ protest, taking their fights to 
the streets.   
Similarly, in the Diamond Fields Advertiser on 28 May: 
Although the protest was initially about lack of service delivery in the area … it 
turned political with both [sic] Modise, Pharasi and Segwagwa launching attacks 
on each other. … Responding to the allegations, Modise said it was a known fact 
that Pharasi and Segwagwa never supported her as ward councillor and that they 
were colluding with one official at the municipality to unseat her. 
(Mokoena, 2013a) 
And the Witness on 3 June cites a DA spokesperson saying that infighting between 
factions of the ANC was creating ‘ongoing dissent [which] is having a severe impact on the 
administration of the town’ (Ngqulunga, 2013b). While factionalism has been identified as a 
contributing factor in ‘service delivery protests’ (e.g. Kunene, 2014; Marais, 2011; Mkhabela, 
2014; Von Holdt & Kirsten, 2011), the media faction frame creates the impression of local 
government and community role players that are so out of control that they are damaging the 
structures they purport to serve, instead of playing orderly, agreeable roles.  By implication, 
the media marks the ANC party members as unfit for governance and suggests that the 
ANC itself is unfit to govern.  
At the same time, the frame links back to the illegitimacy cluster, because significant 
role-players claim that the protests are not legitimately about service delivery. They thus cast 
aspersions on protesters’ motives, and in effect, discredit the protesters, for example in The 
New Age on 28 August: 
KWADUKUZA mayor Ricardo Mthembu has made startling allegations that there 
are people inside the ANC who want him out and were turning the community 
against him. … “The protests are not legitimate … these waves of protest are 
perpetuated by certain individuals within my organisation who want to oust me. 
(Mdletshe, 2013) 
Since the factional frames are linked to the corruption frames (see Figure 3 on page 
52), and these frames are mainly put forward by local government role players (see Figure 
12 on page 57), the media are in effect using elite voices to tar other elites. However, the 
factional frame also creates an excuse for the media not to investigate corruption claims to 
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establish their validity, because too much confusion is created by competing voices. At the 
same time, the factional frame is one form of the contest frame typically taken up across 
media (Benford & Snow, 2000; Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000); it 
implies that the media are able to present a dispute without taking sides, and thus reinforces 
notions of the media as ‘objective’. The faction frame feeds into other frames in the ‘failing 
state’ cluster, because like the failed governance frame it suggests that leadership is lacking, 
and disorder reigns at local government level. 
 
High prevalence of protest ‘authorises’ moralising 
Highlighting disorder at local government level and within the ruling party legitimises the use 
of the moral frame (either by highlighting the views of residents and CSOs opposed to 
protest, or through the editorial voice — see Figure 12 on page 57). This frame is rarely used 
(5 of 55 articles) (see Figure 3 on page 52), but as it fits with the failing state cluster, I have 
chosen to highlight its tenor. The moral frame is always normative (Kyriacou, 2014), 
assuming a prevailing, society-wide set of standards and norms to which everyone ascribes 
(or should ascribe). As discussed in previous sections, other frames also include 
assumptions of society-wide standards that include an orderly state, orderly citizens that 
communicate with each other in state-led structures, and constructively channel 
disagreements into orderly conduct. The moral frame tries to show its allegiance to a 
society-wide set of norms, for example, in a Daily Dispatch editorial on 25 January:  
… please say a prayer for the six families who are mourning the death of their 
loved one following yet another week of violent protests … the unrelenting 
violence that has accompanied the protests was unnecessary and disturbing. 
(Editor, 2013b) 
The editor assumes that all people say prayers for mourning families, and all would 
join in calling protests ‘unnecessary and disturbing’. The moral frame sets itself up as 
“common sense” and implies that all reasonable humans would agree with the particular 
ideological notion being touted, for example, in the Star on 17 October: 
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But it’s neither the broken promises nor the seething fury that is the harbinger of 
doom; it is the way in which this disquiet is being handled that should break the 
heart of every concerned South African. 
(Editor, 2013c) 
In this article there is a notion of the right feelings that every South African should have 
— everyone should be ‘heartbroken’, with the implication that everyone should read the 
situation in the same way, and agree that government is not handling protests as the editor 
sees fit. The moral frame emphasises that certain behaviours and actions are right and 
proper, while others are not, for example, as highlighted in a bold pull quote in the Daily 
Dispatch on 21 March, ‘[y]ou can’t claim to want service delivery and then destroy existing 
services’ (Plaatjie, 2013). The moral frame also involves ascribing motives and actions to 
deviant others, for example, attributing selfish, thoughtless actions to protesters, as 
highlighted in a bold pull quote in The New Age 26 March, ‘[t]hose who torch buses don’t 
think about the consequences of their actions’ (Masilela, 2013). 
The moral frame is linked to the prevalence frame in the cluster analysis (see Figure 3 
on page 52), and while the prevalence frame is largely touted by academics (see Figure 12 
on page 57), the prevalence frame is also used to justify a ‘moral panic’ about ‘service 
delivery protests’. While the prevalence frame mainly just gives data, it is linked to other 
frames in the ‘failing state’ cluster because the prevalence of ‘service delivery protests’ is 
used to justify a critique of the South African state. 
The frames used in the ‘failing state’ cluster all point to a universal standard of normal 
behaviour (the moral frame), embodying an ideal state structure (where citizen—state 
contestation takes place in government invited spaces), where specific roles are assigned to 
the police, counsellors, mayors, the President, and other government officials, who act with 
orderly procedures, to deliver technocratic solutions to an appeased citizenry. By this 
political and ideological standard, the South African state is failing — by failing to exert 
proper leadership governance and quell protest, by being corrupt, by being embroiled in 
political disputes, and by failing to exhibit the right morals. While the concern (or is it 
demand?) expressed is for ‘good governance’, there is an implicit assumption that better 
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models for functioning states are known, and a different political party might be able to 
deliver what the ANC does not.  
While this cluster might be unusual in the framing of protest action as compared to 
international literature on framing protests, it is not unusual in the framing of African states. 
The failing state discourse is often adopted by international institutions in relation to Africa 
(Englebert & Tull, 2008; Gruffydd Jones, 2013; Osaghae, 2007; Szeftel, 1998), and it 
assumes ‘[t]he superior capacity of Western states to govern and the proper form of the 
Western liberal state as a universal model’ (Gruffydd Jones, 2013, p. 65). The media, in 
using the frames in the failing state cluster, at best reveals antagonism to the ruling party, 
and at worst assumes it knows better than elected officials do how to run the government. 
This aligns with Wasserman and De Beer’s (2004, p. 64) assertion that the South African 
media’s ‘relationship with government remained uneasy’.  
 
6.4. Weighing up protest with cumbersome machines 
In the cluster on weighing up protest, the frames attempt to weigh up the pros and cons of 
protest, in various ways. This cluster consists of less prevalent frames (see Figure 1 on page 
48), and less strong clusters (see Figure 3 on page 52). The strongest sub-cluster in this 
cluster is around the inconvenience and economic frames, which attempts to weigh up the 
cost of protest. The next strongest sub-cluster around collective action and sympathy 
frames, attempts to weigh up protest from the point of view aligned with protesters. The sub-
cluster around democracy, contest and rights frames is much weaker (see Figure 12 on 
page 57), but looks at the systematic and procedural aspects around protest, as well as the 
competing voices. 
 
Weighing up the costs of protest 
Given the emphasis on economic conditions and neoliberalism in the literature, the media’s 
minimal use of this frame is striking (see Figure 1 on page 48). Also surprising is that the 
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main source for the economic frame is the police (see Figure 12 on page 57) — hardly an 
authority on economic matters. All but one of the articles using an economic frame use 
economic arguments against protesters. In particular, the police highlight the expense of 
policing protests, for example, in The New Age on 14 May, the Gauteng police commissioner 
said: ‘It is our duty to police any protest but when in turns violent, it means more resources 
and manpower to address it,’ (Ramothwala, 2013a). Similarly, in the Daily News of 
4 October, a police spokesman argues that ‘protests were placing a great strain on police 
resources’ (Joyce & Dawood, 2013). This framing suggests that ‘service delivery protests’ 
are too expensive to police, but, for example, it does not calculate the costs to protesters 
lives of not protesting (e.g. invisible but ongoing economic hardship).  
Costs are again highlighted in the Witness on 25 July, when an Agricultural Union 
representative argues that a road blockade is problematic because ‘it was essential for 
farmers to have immediate access to markets and businesses’ (Ngqulunga, 2013a). And in 
the Cape Argus on 5 November, a labour lawyer argues that protests create ‘a strong feeling 
in the business community that they should not invest anything further in their business’ 
(Meyer, 2013). By framing economic concerns in this way, the articles imply that business 
and farmers’ economic interests are more important than the protesters’ economic interests, 
which receive no mention. 
Only one article in the Star on 13 March breaks this pattern, with a resident 
highlighting why the protest is necessary: ‘this water situation is putting us out of business’ 
(Motumi, 2013b). This quote is telling; despite the framing in other articles, business owners 
are not universally united in condemning protests — some business owners also have 
problems with accessing services and getting attention for their issues, so they either 
participate in protests or support protesters. However, even here, the article does not take 
the discussion further to explore how many businesses are affected by poor service delivery, 
and how many people are unable to pursue economic, livelihood activities due to poor 
services.  
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Overall, the economic frame chosen in discussing ‘service delivery protests’ is 
extremely narrow: none of the articles look at the economic issues facing local 
municipalities, the economic doctrine followed, and how this impacts on local residents. 
Focussing on the costs of protest instead of the broad economic factors underpinning protest 
emphasises the nuisance aspect of protests, creating a negative view of protests.  
Similarly, the inconvenience frame emphasises the ‘perceived bothersome effects’ of 
protest (Di Cicco, 2010, p. 136). For example, in the Star on 13 March, a police spokesman 
argues that ‘service delivery protest’ is limiting access to services because ‘Pikitup, 
emergency ambulances, fire departments and public transport can’t get into the roads’ 
(Motumi, 2013b); it also cites a city council official arguing that people cannot catch taxis in 
the ‘usual spots’ (ibid). Curiously, only police and government officials are quoted citing this 
litany of complaints, not residents. Similarly, in an article in The New Age on 26 March 
entitled: ‘Torched buses inconvenience many’, it is again officials (a bus company official) 
worrying about residents’ safety in trying to get to work (Masilela, 2013). Difficulties getting to 
work are also cited as inconveniences in other articles; for example, the Daily Dispatch on 
30 April, a protest meant ‘motorists and commuters struggled to get into the city for the start 
of the day’s work’ (Linden et al., 2013). 
Since blockading roads is a common strategy in ‘service delivery protests’ (see e.g. 
Alexander, 2010), we can assume protesters are aware of and intend to create disruption 
and inconvenience. Protests are ‘subversive acts that challenge normalized practices, 
modes of causation, or systems of authority’ (Beissinger, 2002). Protesters are unlikely to 
get media attention without creating disruption, as the disruption is what creates value for 
news organisations (Barnett, 2003). By focussing on the inconvenience, instead of the 
underlying causes, the media are ‘directly hindering’ the cause of the protesters (Baylor, 
1996, p. 249). In choosing the inconvenience frame, the media align with the ‘counter-
mobilization of elites’ (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 228) to oppose protesters. Instead of 
helping poor communities to meet their service delivery and political needs, the media 
‘reinforce existing power arrangements within the social system’ (Strohm, 1999, p. 81). 
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Balancing the scales and seeing through protesters eyes? 
A small number of articles do sympathise with the protesters — or at least, identify 
sympathetic issues that could be driving protest. For example, in the Saturday Star on 
20 April, ‘community’s anger derives from the potential corruption documented in 
government papers’ (Olalde & Makhetha, 2013). Similarly, when The Times quotes 
researcher Dr Barbara Tapela on water ‘service delivery protests’, she sympathetically 
states: ‘It is not easy to go to work or find work when a person has not bathed or washed 
their clothes [due to water scarcity]’ (Mouton, 2013). While she is an ‘expert’, speaking from 
observed experience in the field, in choosing a researcher to speak to the issues, instead of 
protesters, the media are still privileging elite voices. 
Only one Diamond Fields Advertiser article, using the headline ‘We are tired of 
buckets’, breaks out of this model, giving extensive coverage to protesters’ voices,  
complaining that they ‘don’t have electricity’ and were ‘using bucket toilets but the 
municipality failed to clear them regularly’ creating health hazards in their homes (Mokoena, 
2013c). The article stands out because protesters get space to document, in detail, their 
problems. The article also incorporates the collective action frame, with protesters indicating 
their intentions to act together, warning that ‘if they were not provided with toilets and 
electricity, they would withhold their votes’ (ibid). A few other articles also highlight 
protesters’ collective action; for example, the Star on 13 March begins with ‘DUBE residents 
want to make sure their area councillor hears their cries,’ (Motumi, 2013b). And in the 
Sunday Independent on 14 April, an academic argues that ‘citizens in their local contexts 
have gained scepticism,’ predisposing them to protest (Booysen, 2013). 
Unlike earlier frames, the collective action frame (alongside the sympathy frame) 
creates the impression that protesters are rational, thinking people, who are familiar with the 
political terrain, and familiar with the available political tactics to engage on that terrain. In 
these handful of articles, we see the only glimmers of a media that has a ‘desire to reach 
under-represented groups’ (Sparks, 2009, p. 214) and show that ‘society is full of political 
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vitality, that opinions and interests contend freely — that society is pluralist’ (Gitlin, 2003, p. 
285). However, given the minimal use of such frames, the media clearly ignore and silence 
certain voices, creating two “publics” — ‘a vocal public’, which has media access ‘and a 
voiceless public whose interests are marginalised’ (Wasserman & De Beer, 2004, p. 69). 
 
Contesting rights and bureaucracy: A cumbersome machine 
While the sympathy and collective action frames do show protesters as human beings, their 
human rights are not unproblematic in some of the other articles. While a rights frame may 
be adopted by protesters themselves, the way the media use the frame is often not aligned 
with protesters’ own framing. In the rights frame, the rights of protesters almost always come 
with caveats, for example, in the Cape Argus on 5 November, an ANC provincial secretary 
argues ‘that while people had a democratic right to protest they must ensure they did so 
peacefully’ (Meyer, 2013). Such caveats again essentially link protest to unlawful activities, 
with ‘service delivery protests’ that are almost automatically associated with violent and 
illegal action by criminals.  
Linking the rights of protesters to their criminality ignores the fact that research has 
shown ‘the vast majority of criminal charges laid against protesters or community activists 
are likely to be withdrawn or dismissed for lack of substance’ (Clark, 2014, p. 55). While the 
police in the sample accuse protesters of criminal activity, in reporting on these claims the 
media help blur the line between protests and criminal activity, ‘enabling the government to 
label protests “illegal” and allowing the police to react with increasing brutality’ (Clark, 2014, 
p. 59). By claiming the protesters are acting illegally, the police in effect deny protesters 
other rights, for example ‘the right to safety and security’ (Nyar & Wray, 2012, p. 31), i.e. 
protection from the police so as to be able to undertake a peaceful, but meaningful protest. 
By deploying the rights language in this limiting way, the media ignores that protesters have 
little means to secure their rights because they ‘have no, or limited, access to public interest 
litigation and are faced with complicated legal and political processes to participate in 
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decisions affecting their material existence’ (Stewart, 2014, p. 3). None of the articles 
acknowledge that a legal loophole means poor communities only have access to a 
progressive realisation of socio-economic rights, creating ‘a state of exception, in which the 
rights of the citizen are suspended and deferred pending appropriate government action’ 
(Veriava, 2014, p. 211). The media does not address how ‘abstract constitutional rights are 
unresponsive to the everyday violence’ experienced by protesters as a result of poverty 
(Stewart, 2014, p. 20). While the protesters attempt to ‘translate local grievances into 
broader claims’ (Baud & Rutten, 2004, p. 1), the language of rights in the sample does not 
challenge the injustices of life at the margins. Instead, the emphasis is on the invited space 
of the courtroom, which must decide whether protesters conducted their protest in a 
legitimate manner, or not. This feeds into the metanarrative that, even though issues of 
power are unresolved in South Africa, state invented spaces must ultimately have the 
arbitrating power, not the citizens. 
However, using a rights language that is contained within the logic of the South African 
governance system does not mean there is no conflict. Indeed, using the contest frame, 
articles in the sample reveal several schisms — between communities and local government 
officials, between elected council official and council employees, and between protesters 
and non-protesters in communities. Although the contest frame is rarely used (11 of 55 
articles), it nevertheless conveys the politics of protest to media audiences (Cottle, 2008).  
For example, in a Daily Dispatch article on 21 March, the protesters claimed that the 
councillor left before addressing their issues, while the Sanco chairwoman argued that ‘most 
residents had no problem with the councillor’ (Plaatjie, 2013). Similarly, in the Diamond 
Fields Advertiser on 28 May, the article focuses on two groups — one supporting the local 
councillor (Modise) and one opposed to her, when ‘residents aligned to Modise clashed with 
those baying for her blood’ (Mokoena, 2013a). These articles do not resolve the conflict, but 
simply record the different voices, each making different allegations. 
The minimal use of the contest frame in the articles in this sample is quite striking, as 
framing studies in general have shown how news stories are ‘a forum for framing contests in 
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which political actors compete by sponsoring their preferred definition of issues’ (Carragee & 
Roefs, 2004, p. 216). In regard to the framing of protests, studies have shown that the 
contest frame is quite popular in juxtaposing official voices to the voices of protesters and 
making protesters’ ‘alternative views seem irrational or lacking’ (Harlow & Johnson, 2011, p. 
1362). The way the contest frame is used in these articles highlighted above does show 
some inclination towards favouring elite voices over protester voices, but they equally show 
different elites arguing. This seems to feed into the failing state narrative, in that it suggests 
that there are too many unresolved differences within local councils, hampering their proper 
functioning. Instead of being a well-oiled machine, local government officials appear to be 
jockeying for position and trying to out-frame each other. In weighing up the different voices, 
most often the sampled articles leave it up to the reader to discern who to believe. 
Similarly, when using the democracy frame (12 of 55 articles — see Figure 3 on page 
52), the articles throw competing points into the mix, but ultimately leave it up to the reader 
to decide what to believe. The bulk of articles using the democracy frame are from The New 
Age (see Figure 2 on page 50) and often reveal the gears of the democratic system turning, 
often in favour of the protesting communities, but sometimes it is unclear if protesting 
communities will really benefit. For example, in Uitenhage, while meetings have been held 
and there is clearly an eagerness to talk, it is unclear what action will result from the 
meetings: 
“Meetings have been held with the people of the northern areas led by human 
settlements portfolio chairperson Buyisile Mkhayu.” … Ngcolomba said a series 
of meetings would be held at various venues in the area tomorrow. … “We are 
always in touch with our people on the ground and are always willing to, and do, 
engage with our communities.” 
(Velaphi, 2013) 
Similarly, in the Daily News on 13 August, the official response to a protest is that a project 
has been approved and communicated, but the community ‘have been waiting a long time 
and are tired of waiting … Motheo Construction Group, had completed stage one of the 
project — which included identifying if the land was large enough’ (Mlambo, 2013b). In this 
article, on the one hand protesters have been waiting a long time for results, and on the 
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other, only stage one of the project has been completed. Nevertheless, it is up to each 
individual reader to weigh up whether or not the council’s progress is satisfactory. The media 
also does not pick up on the out-sourcing of services here, even though ‘the record of private 
company involvement is a poor one with specific reference to disadvantage communities’ 
(Narsiah, 2002, p. 7) — in this case, for example, it would be interesting to know how much 
was paid to Motheo Construction Group, simply for identifying land and establishing if it was 
large enough. This again links into the already discussed failings in the economic frame 
used by the media, in that outsourcing is taken at face value, in a model whereby, while 
facilitated by government, delivery by business is preferred over direct delivery by 
government. The framing reveals local officials’ efforts ‘to manage poverty and deprivation’ 
and the attempt to ‘render technical that which is inherently political’ (Hart, 2013a, p. 5). In 
framing the actions of government in this way, the media create the impression that 
answering the protesters effectively is simply a technical question. While this frame does not 
entirely ‘discredit and marginalize protest actions’ (Harlow & Johnson, 2011, p. 1359), it does 
position the proper response as a bureaucratic one, rather than at a level of political 
decision-making, with the protesters having space to voice their concerns and be heard. 
Overall, in the cluster of frames ‘weighing up’ protest, the media seems to definitively 
refuse to adopt a position and instead leave it to the reader to weigh it up. However, given 
the sparseness with which many of the frames in this cluster are used, the overall effect of a 
media who encourages ‘weighing up’ remains negligible. Instead the more dominant frames 
of delegitimising protest and delegitimising the ‘failing state’ hold far stronger sway.  
 
6.5. Injustice  
Since it is not only the frames in media stories that create a picture of power and politics at 
play, but also the frames that are excluded (Durham, 2001), this analysis looks at the 
injustice frame, which only appears in 2 of the 55 articles (see Figure 3 on page 52). The 
injustice frame is relevant to social protest, because social movement theorists looking at 
social movement framing have identified the injustice frame as key to social movement 
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messaging (Baud & Rutten, 2004; Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson et al., 1992; Harlow & 
Johnson, 2011; Johnston & Noakes, 2005; Snow, 2008). Because the injustice frame is 
highly favoured by protesters and movements, if the media was adopting the frames of 
protesters at all, one would expect to see much more of the injustice frame in the sample 
than is apparent. While the protesters in this sample have won the battle for media access, 
the lack of an injustice frame in the sample points to a failed ‘fight for the definition and 
framing of [the] covered issue’ (Walgrave & Manssens, 2005, p. 116). At the same time, the 
poor showing of the injustice frame points to the ‘inability of organised journalists to relate 
the needs and interests of the very communities they claim to serve’ (Duncan, 2003, p. 2).  
 
6.6. Conclusion 
Even in introducing frames that are sympathetic to protesters, the weight of the evidence 
from this frame analysis is neither in favour of protesters, nor in favour of the ‘failing state’, 
but aligned instead with another ‘invisible’ force that attempts to grapple with our new 
democracy, while remaining sceptical of its possibilities for success. This suggests that the 
South African media, like the US media in Gitlin’s (2003) study, is indirectly shaped by a 
‘dominant economic class’ whose interests are aligned neither with the poor communities 
who attempt to highlight their livelihood struggle, nor with the newly formed state that claims 
to answer to these poor communities. The preferred solution to the protests is posited as a 
technocratic one, especially through the democracy frame adopted by The New Age, but 
also through the rights frame (where the court must arbitrate), a different type of policing, 
firmer leadership, and allocation or roles to councillors and other government officials. The 
injustices and harsh economic realities are almost invisible in the sample analysed; tackling 
injustice and changing the economic order are not imagined as solutions to protests.  
The organising principle underlying the articles is one of interrogating ‘service delivery 
protests’ within the context of existing and potential models of states and citizenship. While 
the preferred state model is not specified in the sample, the chosen frames ‘consist of tacit 
rather than overt conjectures’ (König, 2012, p. 3). Implicit in the chosen frames is that the 
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media support a strengthened state bureaucracy to deliver consistent service, rather than a 
model in which the state engages citizens to resolve problems with diverse solutions, 
specific to local circumstances. Hence, the model does not support a stronger voice for 
citizens, but a state that has a firmer hand on citizens, and is thus able to limit citizen action. 
However, the study is limited in that it only looked at a one year (2013) sample of 
newspaper articles; therefore these finding may not be applicable to other years, and may 
not reflect the overall picture from all media (including radio, television, and internet news 
sources). Further studies of the South African media are needed to assess if, in particular, 
the failing state frame is common across other types of political coverage, or if it is unique to 
‘service delivery protest’ coverage in 2013. 
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7. Conclusion 
The framing analysis method has proved extremely useful in unpacking how the media 
views political action in South Africa, and how ‘the news media are part of politics and part of 
protest’ (Oliver and Maney, 2000, p. 463). In particular, rather than simply analysing the 
prevalence of frames, the hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method was useful for 
analysing how the different frames relate to each other and are connected: this method 
allowed me to unpack patterns of frames, so that themes could be identified and explored.  
Nevertheless, this study contributes to framing studies in general, and specifically to framing 
studies of protest, and to South African media framing studies.  
This study has confirmed the hypotheses that South African newspaper coverage in 
2013 was not advantageous to protesters and mainly highlighted the dramaturgy of protest, 
without much deeper analysis; and newspapers mainly used elite sources, rarely using 
protesters as sources. Because of the framing and choice of sources, the media does not 
aid protesters in getting their message across, and often instead frames protesters as either 
irrational/ emotional or criminal. In the sample of 55 articles analysed, local government and 
police sources have the most power to define and explain ‘service delivery protests’, and do 
so in a way that suggests ‘service delivery protests’ are illegitimate. 
The weakness of protesters’ voice as a source in the sample suggests that the 
protesters are not framing their issues in a way that media are receptive to; this implies a 
weakness in protesters messaging, and perhaps in how it goes about engaging the media. 
For example, it would be interesting to know if ‘service delivery protests’ go along with press 
releases stating the aims and intentions of the protest, and if so, are these ignored? 
However, that question is beyond the scope of this study.  
South African newspaper framing of ‘service delivery protests’ in 2013 is similar to 
framing of protest elsewhere in the world, which promotes a negative view of protests (Di 
Cicco, 2010), mainly frames dramaturgy (Baylor, 1996; Cottle, 2008; Harlow and Johnson, 
2011), and prefers elite sources (Carragee and Roefs, 2004; Gitlin, 2003; Matthes, 2012). 
However, unlike media elsewhere in the world, the media does not frame ‘service delivery 
Rebecca Pointer PNTREB001 University of Cape Town FAM5006W: Minor Dissertation 
  90 
 
protests’ in such a way as to ‘reinforce existing power arrangements within the social 
system’ (Strohm, 1999, p. 81). Instead, using the failed democracy frame, as well as failed 
governance, police action, corruption and factionalism frames, the articles in the sample 
endeavour to show that the government is failing to create appropriate spaces for citizens to 
voice their concerns, failing to use its police force to effectively quell protests, failing to show 
leadership by firmly bringing protests under control, failing to prevent corruption, and failing 
to effectively deal with power contests within the ruling party. This litany of failures, builds up 
to a failing state narrative: one that is not common in previous studies of media framing of 
protests, but is common to narratives about Africa (Cornwall, 2007; Englebert and Tull, 2008; 
Gruffydd Jones, 2013; Gruffydd-Jones, 2008; Szeftel, 1998). The only exceptions to this 
failed state narrative are provided by the pro-government newspaper, The New Age, which 
endeavours to show how local government officials are, in fact, delivering services and 
accountable to the protesting communities. 
The framing of a failing state in relation to ‘service delivery protests’ underscores how 
the South African media are ‘political actors in their own right’ (Walgrave and Manssens, 
2005, p. 117) — their position is both anti-protesters and anti-ruling party, and pro- a state in 
which citizen action is controlled by and limited to official government structures. The media 
(other than The New Age) is therefore challenging the existing social order, and proposing 
alternatives, although it does not go as far as naming specific alternatives. On the other 
hand, The New Age supports the existing social order, and implies that protesting 
communities simply need more patience. 
The media framing of ‘service delivery protests’ is markedly different to the literature 
on the topic; for example, whereas the literature shows local politicians trying to juggle 
protesters demands for delivery with national government demands for fiscal austerity (Hart, 
2002), this complexity is not apparent in the media coverage. Indeed, the coverage does not 
really tackle the relationship between ‘service delivery protests’ and the economy, except 
insofar as to suggest that protest is bad for business. Furthermore, given that according to 
the literature protesters see themselves as demanding various rights — particularly socio-
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economic ones  (Tapela, 2012; Thompson and Nleya, 2010; Thompson, 2011) — it is 
striking that the media never mentions these socio-economic rights, and only mentions the 
right to protest with caveats limiting the right to protest . And while the protesters’ call can be 
read as a call for justice (Baud and Rutten, 2004; Benford and Snow, 2000; Harlow and 
Johnson, 2011; Johnston and Klandermans, 2013; Snow, 2008), the injustice frame is all but 
invisible in the coverage in this sample, suggesting that the media are blind to the ‘systemic 
and structural violence’ (Stewart, 2014, p. 3) that accompanies protesters’ everyday lives. 
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Appendix 1: Frame cluster analysis calculation 
 
Box 1: Calculation of Frame Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (Ward’s method) using R statistical analysis 
software 
Computed using R version 3.1.0 running in IPython 2.2.0 from data - all sheet. 
  
frames_data <- read.csv("data - all.csv") 
rownames(frames_data) <- frames_data[,1] 
frames_data = frames_data[,-1] # remove first column - this is the article names 
frames_data = frames_data[2:56,] # 56 articles - remove first row, it’s the totals 
frames_data = frames_data[,1:19] # 19 frames 
# add the article count to the label 
colnames(frames_data) <- lapply(colnames(frames_data),  
function(x) { paste(x, sum(frames_data[,x])) } )  
# this code is for running pvclust (with the fix so we can use ward.D2 ) 
source("pvclust.R") 
source("pvclust-internal.R") 
frames_result = pvclust(frames_data, method.dist="binary", method.hclust="ward.D2", nboot=1000) 
svg("clusters_by_frames_pvclust.svg") 
plot(frames_result) 
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Appendix 2: Source cluster analysis calculation 
Box 2: Calculation of Source Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (Ward’s method) using R statistical analysis 
software 
Computed using R version 3.1.0 running in IPython 2.2.0 from data - Sources sheet.  
sources_data <- read.csv("data - Sources.csv") 
rownames(sources_data) <- sources_data[,1] 
sources_data = sources_data[,-1] # remove first column - this is the article names 
sources_data = sources_data[1:55,] # 56 articles 
sources_data = sources_data[,1:15] # 15 different types of sources 
# remove poorly represented data 
sources_data = sources_data[,!(colnames(sources_data) %in%  
c("Lawyer","Public.Protector", "Bureaucrat", "Farmer"))]  
# add the article count to the label 
colnames(sources_data) <- lapply(colnames(sources_data),  
function(x) { paste(x, sum(sources_data[,x])) } )  
# this code is for running pvclust (with the fix so we can use ward.D2 ) 
source("pvclust.R") 
source("pvclust-internal.R") 
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Appendix 3: Calculations correlating frames and sources 
Box 3: Calculation of correlation ratios between sources and frames 
Computed using R version 3.1.0 running in IPython 2.2.0 from data - all & Sources sheets 
#This is all python code 
import pandas 
# first look at the list of sources 
# we want to be able to find the set of articles for a given source 
data = pandas.io.parsers.read_csv('data - Sources.csv') 
excluded_sources = ("Lawyer", "Bureaucrat", "Farmer", "Public Protector") 
excluded_frames = ("injustice", "dialogue") 
# select only the grid: 56 rows by 16 columns 
# the rows are articles, the columns are the articles names (removed below) and sources 
data = data.iloc[0:55,0:16] 
# now take the article names, we'll use them for row names 
index = data[data.columns[0]] 
# and delete that first column (article names), set the row names and our dataframe is  
# done 
del data[data.columns[0]] 
data.index = index 
# Exclude rarely cited sources 
for colname in excluded_sources: 
    data = data.drop(colname, 1) 
sources = data.columns 
source_to_art = dict() 
numbered_source_labels = [] 
for source_str in data.columns: 
    source_to_art[source_str] = set() 
    for i, value in enumerate(data[source_str]): 
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        article_name = index[i] 
       if value: 
            source_to_art[source_str].add(article_name) 
    numbered_source_labels.append("{} {}".format(source_str, 
len(source_to_art[source_str]))) 
# now we want two things: 
# total # of articles for a frame (Narticles_with_frame) 
# set of articles for a given frame 
#  with this we can intersect this set with the set of articles with a source  
#  to get the Narticles_with_frame_and_source 
data = pandas.io.parsers.read_csv('data - all.csv') 
# select rows 2 to 57 (the articles) and columns 0 to 20 (article name + 19 frames) 
data = data.iloc[1:56,0:20] 
#print "first row", data.iloc[0] 
# get the article names to use as row names 
article_index = data[data.columns[0]] 
# remove first column 
del data[data.columns[0]] 
data.index = article_index 
# remove poorly represented frames 
for colname in excluded_frames: 
    data = data.drop(colname, 1) 
frames = data.columns 
numbered_frame_labels = [] 
ratio_frame = pandas.DataFrame(columns=frames, index=sources, dtype='float_') 
num_articles_frame = pandas.DataFrame(columns=frames, index=sources, dtype='int_') 
frame_to_art = dict() 
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for frame_str in data.columns: 
    frame_to_art[frame_str] = set() 
    for i, value in enumerate(data[frame_str]): 
       article_name = article_index.iloc[i] 
       if value: 
            frame_to_art[frame_str].add(article_name) 
    numbered_frame_labels.append("{} {}".format(frame_str, len(frame_to_art[frame_str]))) 
    for source_str in sources: 
        total_articles_this_frame = len(frame_to_art[frame_str]) 
        article_this_frame_this_source = len( 
                   frame_to_art[frame_str].intersection(source_to_art[source_str])) 
        ratio = float(article_this_frame_this_source) / float(total_articles_this_frame) 
        num_articles_frame[frame_str][source_str] = article_this_frame_this_source 
        ratio_frame[frame_str][source_str] = ratio 
output_filename = "frame_source_ratios.csv" 
ratio_frame.to_csv(output_filename) 
num_articles_frame.to_csv("num_articles_by_source_and_frame.csv") 
#This is all R code: 
%%R -i ratio_frame,sources,numbered_source_labels,numbered_frame_labels 
library(gplots) 
rownames(ratio_frame) <- numbered_source_labels 
colnames(ratio_frame) <- numbered_frame_labels 
ward_clust <- function(x,...) hclust(x, method="ward.D2", ...) 
svg("heatmap.svg") 
heatmap.2(as.matrix(ratio_frame), hclustfun=ward_clust, col=grey(seq(1,0,-0.01))) 
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